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Abstract. Verifiability is central to building protocols and systems with integrity. Initially, efficient
methods employed the Fiat-Shamir heuristics. Since 2008, the Groth-Sahai techniques have been the
most efficient in constructing non-interactive witness indistinguishable and zero-knowledge proofs for al-
gebraic relations in the standard model. For the important task of proving membership in linear subspaces,
Jutla and Roy (Asiacrypt 2013) gave significantly more efficient proofs in the quasi-adaptive setting (QA-
NIZK). For membership of the row space of a t×nmatrix, their QA-NIZK proofs save Ω(t) group elements
compared to Groth-Sahai. Here, we give QA-NIZK proofs made of a constant number group elements –
regardless of the number of equations or the number of variables – and additionally prove them unbounded
simulation-sound. Unlike previous unbounded simulation-sound Groth-Sahai-based proofs, our construc-
tion does not involve quadratic pairing product equations and does not rely on a chosen-ciphertext-secure
encryption scheme. Instead, we build on structure-preserving signatures with homomorphic properties. We
apply our methods to design new and improved CCA2-secure encryption schemes. In particular, we build
the first efficient threshold CCA-secure keyed-homomorphic encryption scheme (i.e., where homomorphic
operations can only be carried out using a dedicated evaluation key) with publicly verifiable ciphertexts.
Keywords. NIZK proofs, simulation-soundness, chosen-ciphertext security, homomorphic cryptography.
1 Introduction
Non-interactive zero-knowledge proofs [8] play a fundamental role in the design of numerous cryp-
tographic protocols. Unfortunately, until breakthrough results in the last decade [31–33], it was not
known how to construct them efficiently without appealing to the random oracle methodology [7].
Groth and Sahai [33] described very efficient non-interactive witness indistinguishable (NIWI) and
zero-knowledge (NIZK) proof systems for algebraic relations in groups equipped with a bilinear map.
For these specific languages, the methodology of [33] does not require any proof of circuit satisfiability
but rather leverages the properties of homomorphic commitments in bilinear groups. As a result, the
length of each proof only depends on the number of equations and the number of variables.
While dramatically more efficient than general NIZK proofs, the GS techniques remain signifi-
cantly more expensive than non-interactive proofs obtained from the Fiat-Shamir heuristic [26] in the
random oracle model [7]: for example, proving that t variables satisfy a system of n linear equations
demands Θ(t+n) group elements where Σ-protocols allow for Θ(t)-size proofs. In addition, GS proofs
are known to be malleable which, although useful in certain applications [5, 18], is undesirable when
NIZK proofs serve as building blocks for non-malleable protocols. To construct chosen-ciphertext-
secure encryption schemes [50], for example, the Naor-Yung/Sahai [46, 51] paradigm requires NIZK
proofs satisfying a form of non-malleability called simulation-soundness [51]: informally, this property
captures the inability of the adversary to prove false statements by itself, even after having observed
simulated proofs for possibly false statements of its choice.
Groth-Sahai proofs can be made simulation-sound using constructions suggested in [32, 15, 34].
⋆ This work was done while this author was at Technicolor (France).
⋆⋆ This author was supported by the CAMUS Walloon Region Project.
However, even when starting from a linear equation, these techniques involve proofs for quadratic
equations, which results in longer proofs. One-time simulation-soundness (i.e., where the adversary
only sees one simulated proof) is more economical to achieve as shown in [39, 42]. Jutla and Roy
suggested a more efficient way to achieve a form of one-time simulation-soundness [37].
Quasi-Adaptive NIZK Proofs. For languages consisting of linear subspaces of a vector space, Jutla
and Roy [38] recently showed how to significantly improve upon the efficiency of the GS paradigm
in the quasi-adaptive setting. In quasi-adaptive NIZK proofs (QA-NIZK) for a class of languages
{Lρ} parametrized by ρ, the common reference string (CRS) is allowed to depend on the particular
language Lρ of which membership must be proved. At the same time, a single simulator should be
effective for the whole class of languages {Lρ}. As pointed out in [38], QA-NIZK proofs are sufficient
for many applications of Groth-Sahai proofs. In this setting, Jutla and Roy [38] gave very efficient
QA-NIZK proofs of membership in linear subspaces. If A ∈ Zt×np is a matrix or rank t < n, in
order to prove membership of the language L = {v ∈ Gn | ∃x ∈ Ztp s.t. v = g
x·A}, the Jutla-Roy
proofs only take O(n − t) group elements – instead of Θ(n + t) in [33] – at the expense of settling
for computational soundness. While highly efficient in the case t ≈ n, these proofs remain of linear
size in n and may result in long proofs when t ≪ n, as is the case in, e.g., certain applications of
the Naor-Yung paradigm [15]. In the general case, we are still lacking a method for building proofs
of size O(t) – at least without relying on non-falsifiable assumptions [45] – which contrasts with the
situation in the random oracle model.
The problem is even harder if we aim for simulation-soundness. While the Jutla-Roy solutions [38]
nicely interact with their one-time simulation-sound proofs [37], they do not seem to readily extend
into unbounded simulation-sound (USS) proofs (where the adversary can see an arbitrary number
of simulated proofs before outputting a proof of its own) while retaining the same efficiency. For
this reason, although they can be applied in specific cases like [15], we cannot always use them in a
modular way to build CCA2-secure encryption schemes in scenarios where security definitions involve
many challenge ciphertexts.
Our Contributions. Recently, in [43], it was pointed out that structure-preserving signatures
(SPS) [3, 2] with (additive) homomorphic properties have unexpected applications in the design of
non-malleable structure-preserving commitments. Here, we greatly extend their range of applications
and demonstrate that they can surprisingly be used (albeit non-generically) in the design of strongly
non-malleable primitives like simulation-sound proofs and chosen-ciphertext-secure cryptosystems.
Concretely, we describe unbounded simulation-sound QA-NIZK proofs of constant-size for linear
subspaces. The length of a proof does not depend on the number of equations or the number of
variables, but only on the underlying assumption. Like those of [38], our proofs are computationally
sound under standard assumptions5. Somewhat surprisingly, they are even asymptotically shorter
than random-oracle-based proofs derived from Σ-protocols.
Moreover, our construction provides unbounded simulation-soundness. Under the Decision Linear
assumption [10], we obtain QA-NIZK arguments consisting of 15 group elements and a one-time
signature with its verification key. As it turns out, it is also the first unbounded simulation-sound
proof system that does not involve quadratic pairing product equations or a CCA2-secure encryption
scheme. Efficiency comparisons (given in Appendix E) show that we only need 20 group elements per
proof where the best USS extension [15] of Groth-Sahai costs 6t+2n+52 group elements. Under the
k-linear assumption, the proof length becomes O(k2) and thus avoids any dependency on the subspace
dimension. Our proof system builds on the linearly homomorphic structure-preserving signatures of
Libert, Peters, Joye and Yung [43], which allow signing vectors of group elements without knowing
their discrete logarithms.
5 Note that these results do not contradict the impossibility results of Gentry and Wichs [30] because, in the quasi-
adaptive setting, the CRS may hide a trapdoor that allows recognizing elements of the language. The proof of [30]
applies to reductions that cannot efficiently detect when the adversary breaks the soundness property.
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For applications, like CCA2 security [46, 51], where only one-time simulation-soundness is needed,
we further optimize our proof system and obtain a relatively simulation-sound QA-NIZK proof sys-
tem, as defined in [37], with constant-size proofs. Under the DLIN assumption (resp. the k-linear
assumption), we achieve relative simulation-soundness with only 4 (resp. k + 2) group elements!
As the first application of USS proofs, we construct a chosen-ciphertext-secure keyed-homomorphic
encryption scheme with threshold decryption. Keyed-homomorphic encryption is a primitive, sug-
gested by Emura et al. [24], where homomorphic ciphertext manipulations are only possible to a
party holding a devoted evaluation key SKh which, by itself, does not enable decryption. The scheme
should provide IND-CCA2 security when the evaluation key is unavailable to the adversary and re-
main IND-CCA1 secure when SKh is exposed. Other approaches to reconcile homomorphism and
non-malleability were taken in [47–49, 12, 18] but they inevitably satisfy weaker security notions than
adaptive chosen-ciphertext security [50]. The results of [24] showed that CCA2-security does not rule
out homomorphicity when the capability to compute over encrypted data is restricted.
Emura et al. [24] gave realizations of chosen-ciphertext-secure keyed-homomorphic schemes based
on hash proof systems [21]. However, these do not readily enable threshold decryption – as would be
desirable in voting protocols – since valid ciphertexts are not publicly recognizable, which makes it
harder to prove CCA security in the threshold setting. Moreover, these solutions are not known to
satisfy the strongest security definition of [24]. The reason is that this definition seemingly requires a
form of unbounded simulation-soundness. Our QA-NIZK proofs fulfill this requirement and provide
an efficient CCA2-secure threshold keyed-homomorphic system where ciphertexts are 65% shorter
than in instantiations of the same high-level idea using previous simulation-sound proofs.
Using our relatively simulation-sound QA-NIZK proofs, we then build adaptively secure non-
interactive threshold cryptosystems with CCA2 security and improved efficiency. The constructions
of Libert and Yung [42] were improved by Escala et al. [25]. So far, the most efficient solution is ob-
tained from the Jutla-Roy results [37, 38] via relatively sound proofs [37]. Using our relatively sound
QA-NIZK proof system, we shorten ciphertexts by Θ(k) elements under the k-linear assumption.
Our Techniques. In our unbounded simulation-sound proofs, each QA-NIZK proof can be seen as
a Groth-Sahai NIWI proof of knowledge of a one-time linearly homomorphic signature on the vector
that allegedly belongs to the linear subspace. Here, the NIWI proof is generated for a Groth-Sahai
CRS that depends on the verification key of a one-time signature (following an idea of Malkin et al.
[44]), the private key of which is used to sign the entire proof so as to prevent re-randomizations. The
reason why it provides unbounded simulation-soundness is that, with non-negligible probability, the
CRS is perfectly hiding on all simulated proofs and extractable in the adversarially-generated fake
proof. Hence, if the adversary manages to prove membership of a vector outside the linear subspace,
the reduction is able to extract a homomorphic signature that it would not have been able to compute
itself, thereby breaking the DLIN assumption. At a high level, the system can be seen as a two-tier
proof system made of a non-malleable proof of knowledge of a malleable proof of membership.
In our optimized relatively-sound proofs, we adapt ideas of Jutla and Roy [37] and combine the
one-time linearly homomorphic signature of [43] with a smooth-projective hash function [21].
Our threshold keyed-homomorphic cryptosystem combines a hash proof system and a publicly
verifiable USS proof that the ciphertext is well-formed. The keyed-homomorphic property is achieved
by using the simulation trapdoor of the proof system as an evaluation key SKh, allowing the evaluator
to generate proofs without knowing the witnesses. As implicitly done in [24] in the case of hash proof
systems, the simulation trapdoor is thus used in the scheme and not only in the security proof.
2 Background and Definitions
2.1 Quasi-Adaptive NIZK Proofs
Quasi-Adaptive NIZK (QA-NIZK) proofs are NIZK proofs where the CRS is allowed to depend on
the specific language for which proofs have to be generated. The CRS is divided into a fixed part Γ ,
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produced by an algorithm K0, and a language-dependent part ψ. However, there should be a single
simulator for the entire class of languages.
Let λ be a security parameter. For public parameters Γ produced by K0, let DΓ be a probability
distribution over a collection of relations R = {Rρ} parametrized by a string ρ with an associated
language Lρ = {x | ∃w : Rρ(x,w) = 1}.
We consider proof systems where the prover and the verifier both take a label lbl as additional in-
put. For example, this label can be the message-carrying part of an Elgamal-like encryption. Formally,
a tuple of algorithms (K0,K1,P,V) is a QA-NIZK proof system for R if there exists a PPT simulator
(S1, S2) such that, for any PPT adversaries A1,A2 and A3, we have the following properties:
Quasi-Adaptive Completeness:
Pr[Γ ← K0(λ); ρ← DΓ ; ψ ← K1(Γ, ρ);
(x,w, lbl)← A1(Γ, ψ, ρ); π ← P(ψ, x,w, lbl) : V(ψ, x, π, lbl) = 1 if Rρ(x,w) = 1] = 1.
Quasi-Adaptive Soundness:
Pr[Γ ← K0(λ); ρ← DΓ ; ψ ← K1(Γ, ρ); (x, π, lbl)← A2(Γ, ψ, ρ) :
V(ψ, x, π, lbl) = 1 ∧ ¬(∃w : Rρ(x,w) = 1)] ∈ negl(λ).
Quasi-Adaptive Zero-Knowledge:
Pr[Γ ← K0(λ); ρ← DΓ ; ψ ← K1(Γ, ρ) : A
P(ψ,.,.)
3 (Γ, ψ, ρ) = 1]
≈ Pr[Γ ← K0(λ); ρ← DΓ ; (ψ, τsim)← S1(Γ, ρ) : A
S(ψ,τsim,.,.,.)
3 (Γ, ψ, ρ) = 1],
where
- P(ψ, ., ., .) emulates the actual prover. It takes as input (x,w) and lbl and outputs a proof π if
(x,w) ∈ Rρ. Otherwise, it outputs ⊥.
- S(ψ, τsim, ., ., .) is an oracle that takes as input (x,w) and lbl. It outputs a simulated proof
S2(ψ, τsim, x, lbl) if (x,w) ∈ Rρ and ⊥ if (x,w) 6∈ Rρ.
We assume that the CRS ψ contains an encoding of ρ, which is thus available to V. The definition of
Quasi-Adaptive Zero-Knowledge requires a single simulator for the entire family of relations R.
2.2 Simulation-Soundness and Relative Soundness
It is often useful to have a property called simulation-soundness, which requires that the adversary be
unable to prove false statements even after having seen simulated proofs for possibly false statements.
Unbounded Simulation-Soundness: For any PPT adversary A4, it holds that
Pr[Γ ← K0(λ); ρ← DΓ ; (ψ, τsim)← S1(Γ, ρ); (x, π, lbl)← A
S2(ψ,τsim,.,.)
4 (Γ, ψ, ρ) :
V(ψ, x, π, lbl) = 1 ∧ ¬(∃w : Rρ(x,w) = 1) ∧ (x, π, lbl) 6∈ Q] ∈ negl(λ),
where the adversary is allowed unbounded access to an oracle S2(ψ, τ, ., .) that takes as input
statement-label pairs (x, lbl) (where x may be outside Lρ) and outputs simulated proofs π ←
S2(ψ, τsim, x, lbl) before updating the set Q = Q ∪ {(x, π, lbl)}, which is initially empty.
In the weaker notion of one-time simulation-soundness, only one query to the S2 oracle is allowed.
In some applications, one may settle for a weaker notion, called relative soundness by Jutla and
Roy [37], which allows for more efficient proofs, especially in the single-theorem case. Informally,
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relatively sound proof systems involve both a public verifier and a private verification algorithm,
which has access to a trapdoor. For hard languages, the two verifiers should almost always agree on
any adversarially-created proof. Moreover, the private verifier should not accept a non-trivial proof
for a false statement, even if the adversary has already seen proofs for false statements.
A labeled single-theorem relatively sound QA-NIZK proof system is comprised of a quasi-adaptive
labeled proof system (K0,K1,P,V) along with an efficient private verifier W and an efficient simulator
(S1, S2). Moreover, the following properties should hold for any PPT adversaries (A1,A2,A3,A4).
Quasi Adaptive Relative Single-Theorem Zero-Knowledge:
Pr[Γ ← K0(λ); ρ← DΓ ; ψ ← K1(Γ, ρ); (x,w, lbl, s)← A
V(ψ,.,.)
1 (Γ, ψ, ρ);
π ← P(ψ, ρ, x, w, lbl) : A
V(ψ,.,.)
2 (π, s) = 1]
≈ Pr[Γ ← K0(λ); ρ← DΓ ; (ψ, τ)← S1(Γ, ρ); (x,w, lbl, s)← A
W(ψ,τ,.,.)
1 (Γ, ψ, ρ);
π ← S2(ψ, ρ, τ, x, lbl) : A
W(ψ,τ,.,.)
2 (π, s) = 1],
Here, A1 is restricted to choosing (x,w) such that Rρ(x,w) = 1.
Quasi Adaptive Relative Single-Theorem Simulation-Soundness:
Pr[Γ ← K0(λ); ρ← DΓ ; (ψ, τ)← S1(Γ, ρ); (x, lbl, s)← A
W(ψ,τ,.,.)
3 (Γ, ψ, ρ);
π ← S2(ψ, ρ, τ, x, lbl) : (x
′, lbl′, π′)← A
W(ψ,τ,.,.)
4 (s, π) :
(x, π, lbl) 6= (x′, π′, lbl′) ∧ 6 ∃w′ s.t. Rρ(x
′, w′) = 1 ∧ W(ψ, τ, x′, lbl′, π′) = 1] ∈ negl(λ)
Note that the definition of relative simulation-soundness does not require the adversary to provide
a witness but the definition of single-theorem zero-knowledge does.
2.3 Definitions for Threshold Keyed-Homomorphic Encryption
A (t,N)-threshold keyed-homomorphic encryption scheme consists of the following algorithms.
Keygen(λ, t,N): takes as input a security parameter λ and integers t,N ∈ poly(λ) (with 1 ≤ t ≤ N),
where N is the number of decryption servers and t ≤ N is the decryption threshold. It outputs
(PK,SKh,VK,SKd), where PK is the public key, SKh is the homomorphic evaluation key,
SKd = (SKd,1, . . . , SKd,N ) is a vector of private key shares and VK = (V K1, . . . , V KN ) is a
vector of verification keys. For each i, the decryption server i is given the share (i, SKd,i). The
verification key V Ki will be used to check the validity of decryption shares generated using SKd,i.
Encrypt(PK,M): takes a input a public key PK and a plaintext M . It outputs a ciphertext C.
Ciphertext-Verify(PK,C): takes as input a public key PK and a ciphertext C. It outputs 1 if C
is deemed valid w.r.t. PK and 0 otherwise.
Share-Decrypt(PK, i, SKd,i, C): on input of a public key PK, a ciphertext C and a private-
key share (i, SKd,i), this (possibly randomized) algorithm outputs a special symbol (i,⊥) if
Ciphertext-Verify(PK,C) = 0. Otherwise, it outputs a decryption share µi = (i, µˆi).
Share-Verify(PK, V Ki, C, µi): takes in PK, the verification key V Ki, a ciphertext C and a pur-
ported decryption share µi = (i, µˆi). It outputs either 1 or 0. In the former case, µi is said to be
a valid decryption share. We adopt the convention that (i,⊥) is an invalid decryption share.
Combine(PK,VK, C, {µi}i∈S): takes in (PK,VK, C) and a t-subset S ⊂ {1, . . . , N} with decryp-
tion shares {µi}i∈S . It outputs either a plaintext M or ⊥ if {µi}i∈S contains invalid shares.
Eval(PK,SKh, C
(1), C(2)): takes as input PK, the evaluation key SKh and ciphertexts C
(1), C(2).
If Ciphertext-Verify(PK,C(j)) = 0 for some j ∈ {1, 2}, the algorithm returns ⊥. Otherwise, it
conducts a binary homomorphic operation over C(1) and C(2) and outputs a ciphertext C.
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The above syntax assumes a trusted dealer. It generalizes that of ordinary threshold cryptosystems.
By setting SKh = ε and discarding the evaluation algorithm, we obtain a classical threshold system.
Definition 1. A threshold keyed-homomorphic public-key cryptosystem is secure against chosen-
ciphertext attacks (or KH-CCA secure) if no PPT adversary has noticeable advantage in this game:
1. The challenger runs Keygen(λ) to obtain a public key PK, vectors SKd = (SKd,1, . . . , SKd,N ),
VK = (V K1, . . . , V KN ) and a homomorphic evaluation key SKh. It gives PK and VK to the
adversary A and keeps (SKh,SKd) to itself. In addition, the challenge initializes a set D ← ∅,
which is initially empty.
2 The adversary A adaptively makes queries to the following oracles on multiple occasions:
- Corruption query: at any time, A may decide to corrupt a decryption server. To this end, it
specifies an index i ∈ {1, . . . , N} and obtains the private key share SKd,i.
- Evaluation query: A can invoke the evaluation oracle Eval(SKh, .) on a pair (C
(1), C(2)) of
ciphertexts of its choice. If there exists j ∈ {1, 2} such that Ciphertext-Verify(PK,C(j)) = 0,
return ⊥. Otherwise, the oracle Eval(SKh, .) computes C ← Eval(SKh, C
(1), C(2)) and returns
C. In addition, if C(1) ∈ D or C(2) ∈ D, it sets D ← D ∪ {C}.
- Reveal query: at any time, A may also decide to corrupt the evaluator by invoking the RevHK
oracle on a unique occasion. The oracle responds by returning SKh.
- Decryption query: A can also invoke the partial decryption oracle on arbitrary ciphertexts C
and indexes i ∈ {1, . . . , n}. If Ciphertext-Verify(PK,C) = 0 or if C ∈ D, the oracle returns
⊥. Otherwise, the oracle returns the decryption share µi ← Share-Decrypt(PK, i, SKd,i, C).
3. The adversary A chooses two equal-length messages M0,M1 and obtains C
⋆ = Encrypt(PK,Mβ)
for some random bit β R← {0, 1}. In addition, the challenger sets D ← D ∪ {C⋆}.
4. A makes further queries as in step 2 with some restrictions. Namely, A cannot corrupt more than
t − 1 servers throughout the entire game. Moreover, if A chooses to obtain SKh (via the RevHK
oracle) at some point, no more post-challenge decryption query is allowed beyond that point.
5. A outputs a bit β′ and is deemed successful if β′ = β. As usual, A’s advantage is measured as the
distance Adv(A) = |Pr[β′ = β]− 12 |.
It is important to note that, even if A chooses to obtain SKh immediately after having seen the
public key PK, it still has access to the decryption oracle before the challenge phase. In other words,
the scheme should remain IND-CCA1 if A is given PK and SKh at the outset of the game. After the
challenge phase, decryption queries are allowed until the moment when the adversary obtains SKh.
In [24], Emura et al. suggested a weaker definition where the adversary is not allowed to query
the evaluation oracle on derivatives of the challenge ciphertext. As a consequence, the set D is always
the singleton {C⋆} after step 3. In this paper, we will stick to the stronger definition.
2.4 Hardness Assumptions
For simplicity, we use symmetric bilinear maps e : G × G → GT over groups of prime order p, but
extensions to the asymmetric setting e : G× Gˆ→ GT are possible.
Definition 2 ([10]). The Decision Linear Problem (DLIN) in G, is to distinguish the distribu-
tions (ga, gb, gac, gbd, gc+d) and (ga, gb, gac, gbd, gz), with a, b, c, d R← Zp, z
R← Zp.
We sometimes use the Simultaneous Double Pairing (SDP) assumption, which is weaker than DLIN.
As noted in [17], any algorithm solving SDP immediately yields a DLIN distinguisher.
Definition 3. The Simultaneous Double Pairing problem (SDP) in (G,GT ) is, given group
elements (gz, gr, hz, hu) ∈ G
4, to find a non-trivial triple (z, r, u) ∈ G3\{(1G, 1G, 1G)} such that
e(gz, z) · e(gr, r) = 1GT and e(hz, z) · e(hu, u) = 1GT .
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2.5 Linearly Homomorphic Structure-Preserving Signatures
Linearly homomorphic SPS schemes are homomorphic signatures where messages and signatures live
in the domain group G (see Appendix B for syntactic definitions) of a bilinear map. Libert et al. [43]
described the following one-time construction and proved its security under the SDP assumption. By
“one-time”, we mean that only one linear subspace can be safely signed using a given key pair.
Keygen(λ, n): given a security parameter λ and the dimension n ∈ N of vectors to be signed,
choose bilinear group (G,GT ) of prime order p > 2
λ. Choose gz, gr, hz, hu
R← G. Then, for i = 1
to n, pick χi, γi, δi
R← Zp and compute gi = gz
χigr
γi and hi = hz
χihu
δi . The private key is
sk = {(χi, γi, δi)}
n
i=1 while the public key is pk =
(
gz, gr, hz, hu, {(gi, hi)}
n
i=1
)
.
Sign(sk, (M1, . . . ,Mn)): to sign a vector (M1, . . . ,Mn) ∈ G
n using sk = {(χi, γi, δi)}
n
i=1, compute
and return (z, r, u) =
(∏n
i=1M
−χi
i ,
∏n
i=1M
−γi
i ,
∏n
i=1M
−δi
i
)
∈ G3.
SignDerive(pk, {(ωi, σ
(i))}ℓ
i=1): given a public key pk and ℓ tuples (ωi, σ
(i)), where ωi ∈ Zp for
each i, parse σ(i) as σ(i) =
(
zi, ri, ui
)
∈ G3 for i = 1 to ℓ. Then, compute and return σ = (z, r, u),
where z =
∏ℓ
i=1 z
ωi
i , r =
∏ℓ
i=1 r
ωi
i and u =
∏ℓ
i=1 u
ωi
i .
Verify(pk, σ, (M1, . . . ,Mn)): given a signature σ = (z, r, u) ∈ G
3 and a vector (M1, . . . ,Mn),
return 1 if and only if (M1, . . . ,Mn) 6= (1G, . . . , 1G) and (z, r, u) satisfy
1GT = e(gz, z) · e(gr, r) ·
n∏
i=1
e(gi,Mi), 1GT = e(hz, z) · e(hu, u) ·
n∏
i=1
e(hi,Mi). (1)
One particularity of this scheme is that, even if the private key is available, it is difficult to find
two distinct signatures on the same vector if the SDP assumption holds: by dividing out the two
signatures, one obtains the solution of an SDP instance (gz, gr, hz, hu) contained in the public key.
Two constructions of full-fledged (as opposed to one-time) linearly homomorphic SPS were given
in [43]. One of these will serve as a basis for our proof system and is recalled in Appendix C. In these
constructions, all algorithms additionally input a tag which identifies the dataset that vectors belongs
to. Importantly, only vectors associated with the same tag can be homomorphically combined.
3 Unbounded Simulation-Sound Quasi-Adaptive NIZK Arguments
In the following, vectors are always considered as row vectors unless stated otherwise. If A ∈ Zt×np is
a matrix, we denote by gA ∈ Gt×n the matrix obtained by exponentiating g using the entries of A.
We consider public parameters Γ = (G,GT , g) consisting of bilinear groups (G,GT ) with a gen-
erator g ∈ G. Like [38], we will consider languages Lρ = {g
x·A ∈ Gn | x ∈ Ztp} that are parametrized
by ρ = gA ∈ Gt×n, where A ∈ Zt×nq is a t× n matrix of rank t < n.
As in [38], we assume that the distribution DΓ is efficiently samplable: there exists a PPT algo-
rithm which outputs a pair (ρ,A) describing a relation Rρ and its associated language Lρ according
to DΓ . One example of such a distribution is obtained by picking a uniform matrix A
R← Zt×np –
which has full rank with overwhelming probability – and setting ρ = gA.
Our construction builds on the homomorphic signature recalled in Appendix C. Specifically, the
language-dependent CRS ψ contains one-time linearly homomorphic signatures on the rows of the
matrix ρ ∈ Gt×n. For each vector v ∈ Lρ, the prover can use the witness x ∈ Z
t
p to derive and prove
knowledge of a one-time homomorphic signature (z, r, u) on v. This signature (z, r, u) is already a
QA-NIZK proof of membership but it does not provide simulation-soundness. To acquire this prop-
erty, we follow [44] and generate a NIWI proof of knowledge of (z, r, u) for a Groth-Sahai CRS that
depends on the verification key of an ordinary one-time signature. The latter’s private key is used
to sign the NIWI proof so as to prevent unwanted proof manipulations. Using the private key of the
homomorphic one-time signature as a trapdoor, the simulator is also able to create proofs for vectors
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v 6∈ Lρ. Due to the use of perfectly NIWI proofs, these fake proofs do not leak any more information
about the simulation key than the CRS does. At the same time, the CRS can be prepared in such a
way that, with non-negligible probability, it becomes perfectly binding on an adversarially-generated
proof, which allows extracting a non-trivial signature on a vector v 6∈ Lρ.
Like [38], our quasi-adaptive NIZK proof system (K0,K1,P,V) is a split CRS construction in that
K1 can be divided into two algorithms (K10,K11). The first one K10 outputs some state information
s and a first CRS CRS2 which is only used by the verifier and does not depend on the language Lρ.
The second part K11 of K1 inputs the state information s and the output of Γ of K0 and outputs
CRS1 which is only used by the prover. The construction goes as follows.
K0(λ): choose groups (G,GT ) of prime order p > 2
λ with g R← G. Then, output Γ = (G,GT , g)
The dimensions (t, n) of the matrix A ∈ Zt×np can be either fixed or part of the language, so that t, n
can be given as input to the CRS generation algorithm K1.
K1(Γ, ρ): parse Γ as (G,GT , g) and ρ as a matrix ρ =
(
Gi,j
)
1≤i≤t, 1≤j≤n
∈ Gt×n.
1. Generate a key pair (pkrand, skrand) for the randomizable signature of Appendix C in order to
sign vectors of Gn. Namely, choose gz, gr, hz, hu
R← G and do the following.
a. For i = 1 to n, pick χi, γi, δi
R← Zp and compute gi = gz
χigr
γi and hi = hz
χihu
δi .
b. Generate L + 1 Groth-Sahai common reference strings, for some L ∈ poly(λ). To this
end, choose f1, f2
R← G and define f1 = (f1, 1, g) ∈ G
3, f2 = (1, f2, g) ∈ G
3. Then, pick
f3,i
R← G3 for i = 0 to L.
Let skrand = {(χi, γi, δi)}
n
i=1 be the private key and the matching public key is
pkrand =
(
gz, gr, hz, hu, {(gi, hi)}
n
i=1, f =
(
f1,f2, {f3,i}
L
i=0
) )
.
2. Use skrand to generate one-time linearly homomorphic signatures {(zi, ri, ui)}
t
i=1 on the vectors
ρi = (Gi1, . . . , Gin) ∈ G
n that form the rows of ρ. These are obtained as
(zi, ri, ui) =
( n∏
j=1
G
−χj
i,j ,
n∏
j=1
G
−γj
i,j ,
n∏
j=1
G
−δj
i,j
)
∀i ∈ {1, . . . , t}.
3. Choose a strongly unforgeable one-time signature Σ = (G,S,V) with verification keys consist-
ing of L-bit strings.
4. The CRS ψ = (CRS1,CRS2) consists of two parts which are defined as
CRS1 =
(
ρ, pkrand, {(zi, ri, ui)}
t
i=1, Σ
)
, CRS2 =
(
pkrand, Σ
)
,
while the simulation trapdoor τsim is skrand = {(χi, γi, δi)}
n
i=1.
P(Γ, ψ,v, x, lbl): given a candidate v ∈ Gn and a witness x = (x1, . . . , xt) ∈ Z
t
p such that v = g
x·A,
generate a one-time signature key pair (SVK, SSK)← G(λ) and do the following.
1. Using {(zj , rj , uj)}
t
j=1, derive a one-time linearly homomorphic signature (z, r, u) on v. Namely,
compute z =
∏t
i=1 z
xi
i , r =
∏t
i=1 r
xi
i and u =
∏t
i=1 u
xi
i .
2. Using SVK = SVK[1] . . . SVK[L] ∈ {0, 1}L, define the vector fSVK = f3,0 ·
∏L
i=1 f
SVK[i]
3,i and
assemble a Groth-Sahai CRS fSVK = (f1,f2,fSVK). Using fSVK, generate commitments Cz,
Cr, Cu to the components of (z, r, u) ∈ G
3 along with NIWI proofs (pi1,pi2) that v and
(z, r, u) satisfy (1). Let (Cz,Cr,Cu,pi1,pi2) ∈ G
15 be the resulting commitments and proofs.
3. Generate σ = S(SSK, (v,Cz,Cr,Cu,pi1,pi2, lbl)) and output
π = (SVK,Cz,Cr,Cu,pi1,pi2, σ) (2)
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V(Γ, ψ,v, π, lbl): parse π as per (2) and return 1 if (i) V(SVK, (v,Cz,Cr,Cu,pi1,pi2, lbl), σ) = 1;
(ii) (Cz,Cr,Cu,pi1,pi2) forms a valid NIWI proof for the CRS fSVK = (f1,f2,fSVK) (see (4) in
Appendix C for the detailed verification equations). If either condition fails to hold, return 0.
In order to simulate a proof for a given vector v ∈ Gn, the simulator uses τsim = skrand to generate
a fresh one-time homomorphic signature on v ∈ Gn and proceeds as in steps 2-3 of algorithm P.
The proof π only consists of 15 group elements and a one-time pair (SVK, σ). Remarkably, its
length does not depend on the number of equations n or the number of variables t. In comparison,
Groth-Sahai proofs already require 3t+2n group elements in their basic form and become even more
expensive when it comes to achieve unbounded simulation-soundness. The Jutla-Roy techniques [38]
reduce the proof length to 2(n − t) elements – which only competes with our proofs when t ≈ n –
but it is unclear how to extend them to get unbounded simulation-soundness without affecting their
efficiency. Our CRS consists of O(t+n+L) group elements against O(t(n− t)) in [38]. More detailed
comparisons are given in Appendix E between proof systems based on the DLIN assumption.
Interestingly, the above scheme even outperforms Fiat-Shamir-like proofs derived fromΣ-protocols
which would give Θ(t)-size proofs here. The construction readily extends to rely on the k-linear as-
sumption for k > 2. In this case, the proof comprises (k + 1)(2k + 1) elements and its size thus only
depends on k, as detailed in Appendix D.
Moreover, the verification algorithm only involves linear pairing product equations whereas all
known unbounded simulation-sound extensions of Groth-Sahai proofs require either quadratic equa-
tions or a linearization step involving extra variables.
We finally remark that, if we give up the simulation-soundness property, the proof length drops
to k + 1 group elements under the k-linear assumption.
Theorem 1. The scheme is an unbounded simulation-sound QA-NIZK proof system if the DLIN
assumption holds in G and Σ is strongly unforgeable. (The proof is given in Appendix F).
We note that the above construction is not tightly secure as the gap between the simulation-
soundness adversary’s advantage and the probability to break the DLIN assumption depends on the
number of simulated proofs obtained by the adversary. For applications like tightly secure public-key
encryption [34], it would be interesting to modify the proof system to obtain tight security.
4 Single-Theorem Relatively Sound Quasi-Adaptive NIZK Arguments
In applications where single-theorem relatively sound NIZK proofs suffice, we can further improve
the efficiency. Under the k-linear assumption, the proof length reduces from O(k2) elements to O(k)
elements. Under the DLIN assumption, each proof fits within 4 elements and only costs 2n+6 pairings
to verify. In comparison, the verifier needs 2(n− t)(t+ 2) pairing evaluations in [38].
As in [37], we achieve relative soundness using smooth projective hash functions [21]. To this end,
we need to encode the matrix ρ ∈ Gt×n as a 2t× (2n+ 1) matrix.
K0(λ): choose groups (G,GT ) of prime order p > 2
λ with g R← G. Then, output Γ = (G,GT , g).
Again, the dimensions of A ∈ Zt×np can be either fixed or part of Lρ, so that t, n can be given as
input to the CRS generation algorithm K1.
K1(Γ, ρ): parse Γ as (G,GT , g) and ρ as ρ =
(
Gij
)
1≤i≤t, 1≤j≤n
∈ Gt×n and do the following.
1. Choose two n-vectors d = (d1, . . . , dn)
R← Znp and e = (e1, . . . , en)
R← Znp in order to define
W = (W1, . . . ,Wt) = g
A·d⊤ ∈ Gt and Y = (Y1, . . . , Yt) = g
A·e⊤ ∈ Gt. These will be used to
define a projective hash function.
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2. Generate a key pair (pkots, skots) for the one-time linearly homomorphic signature of Section
2.5 in order to sign vectors in G2n+1. Let pkots =
(
(G,GT ), gz, gr, hz, hu, {(gi, hi)}
2n+1
i=1
)
be the
public key and let skots = {(χi, γi, δi)}
2n+1
i=1 be the corresponding private key.
3. Use skots to generate one-time linearly homomorphic signatures {(zi, ri, ui)}
2t
i=1 on the inde-
pendent vectors below, which are obtained from the rows of the matrix ρ =
(
Gi,j
)
1≤i≤t, 1≤j≤n
.
H2i−1 = (Gi,1, . . . , Gi,n, Yi, 1 , . . . , 1 ) ∈ G
2n+1 i ∈ {1, . . . , t}
H2i = (1 , . . . , 1 ,Wi, Gi,1, . . . , Gi,n) ∈ G
2n+1
4. Choose a collision-resistant hash function H : {0, 1}∗ → Zp.
5. The CRS ψ consists of a first part CRS1 that is only used by the prover and a second part
CRS2 which is only used by the verifier. These are defined as
CRS1 =
(
ρ, pkots, W , Y , {(zi, ri, ui)}
2t
i=1, H
)
, CRS2 =
(
pkots, W , Y , H
)
.
The simulation trapdoor τsim is skots and the private verification trapdoor is τv = {d, e}.
P(Γ, ψ,v, x, lbl): given a candidate v ∈ Gn, a witness x = (x1, . . . , xt) ∈ Z
t
p such that v = g
x·A
and a label lbl, compute α = H(ρ,v, lbl) ∈ Zp. Then, using {(zi, ri, ui)}
2t
i=1, derive a one-time
linearly homomorphic signature (z, r, u) on the vector v˜ =
(
v1, . . . , vn, π0, v
α
1 , . . . , v
α
n
)
∈ G2n+1,
where π0 =
∏t
i=1(W
α
i Yi)
xi . Namely, compute and output the proof π = (z, r, u, π0) ∈ G
4, where
z =
t∏
i=1
(z2i−1 · z
α
2i)
xi , r =
t∏
i=1
(r2i−1 · r
α
2i)
xi , u =
t∏
i=1
(u2i−1 · u
α
2i)
xi π0 =
t∏
i=1
(Wαi Yi)
xi
V(Γ, ψ,v, π, lbl): parse v as (v1, . . . , vn) ∈ G
n and π as (z, r, u, π0) ∈ G
4. Compute α = H(ρ,v, lbl)
and return 1 if and only if (z, r, u) is a valid signature on v˜ = (v1, . . . , vn, π0, v
α
1 , . . . , v
α
n) ∈ G
2n+1.
Namely, it should satisfy the equalities 1GT = e(gz, z) · e(gr, r) ·
∏n
i=1 e(gi · g
α
i+n+1, vi) · e(gn+1, π0)
and 1GT = e(hz, z) · e(hu, u) ·
∏n
i=1 e(hi · h
α
i+n+1, vi) · e(hn+1, π0).
W(Γ, ψ, τv,v, π, lbl): given v = (v1, . . . , vn) ∈ G
n, parse π as (z, r, u, π0) ∈ G
4 and τv as {d, e}, with
d = (d1, . . . , dn) ∈ Z
n
p and e = (e1, . . . , en) ∈ Z
n
p . Compute α = H(ρ,v, lbl) ∈ Zp and return 0 if
the public verification test V fails. Otherwise, return 1 if π0 =
∏n
j=1 v
ej+αdj
j and 0 otherwise.
We note that, while the proving algorithm is deterministic, each statement has many valid proofs.
However, finding two valid proofs for the same statement is computationally hard, as will be shown
in the proof of Theorem 2.
The scheme readily extends to rest on the k-linear assumption with k > 2. In this case, the proof
requires k + 2 group elements – whereas combining the techniques of [37, 38] demands k(n + 1 − t)
elements per proof – and a CRS of size O(k(n+t)). From a security standpoint, we prove the following
result in Appendix G.
Theorem 2. The above proof system is a relatively sound QA-NIZK proof system if the SDP as-
sumption holds in (G,GT ) and if H is a collision-resistant hash function.
As an application, we describe a new adaptively secure CCA2-secure non-interactive threshold
cryptosystem based on the DLIN assumption in Appendix I. Under the k-linear assumption, the
scheme provides ciphertexts that are Θ(k) group elements shorter than in previous such constructions.
Under the DLIN assumption, ciphertexts consist of 8 elements of G, which spares one group element
w.r.t. the best previous variants [37, 38] of Cramer-Shoup with publicly verifiable ciphertexts.
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5 An Efficient Threshold Keyed-Homomorphic KH-CCA-Secure Encryption
Scheme from the DLIN Assumption
The use of linearly homomorphic signatures as publicly verifiable proofs of ciphertext validity in the
Cramer-Shoup paradigm [20, 21] was suggested in [43]. However, the latter work only discusses non-
adaptive (i.e., CCA1) attacks. In the CCA2 case, a natural idea is to proceed as in our unbounded
simulation-sound proof system and use the verification key of a on-time signature as the tag of a ho-
momorphic signature: since cross-tag homomorphic operations are disallowed, the one-time signature
will prevent illegal ciphertext manipulations after the challenge phase.
To obtain the desired keyed-homomorphic property, we use the simulation trapdoor of a simulation-
sound proof system as the homomorphic evaluation key. This approach was already used by Emura
et al. [24] in the context of designated verifier proofs. Here, publicly verifiable proofs are obtained
from a homomorphic signature scheme of which the private key serves as an evaluation key: anyone
equipped with this key can multiply two ciphertexts (or, more precisely, their built-in homomorphic
components), generate a new tag and sign the resulting ciphertext using the private key of the homo-
morphic signature. Moreover, we can leverage the fact that the latter private key is always available
to the reduction in the security proof of the homomorphic signature [43]. In the game of Definition
1, the simulator can thus hand over the evaluation key SKh to the adversary upon request.
Emura et al. [24] gave constructions of KH-CCA secure encryption schemes based on hash proof
systems [21]. However, these constructions are only known to provide a relaxed flavor of KH-CCA
security where evaluation queries should not involve derivatives of the challenge ciphertext. The reason
is that 2-universal hash proof systems [21] only provide a form of one-time simulation soundness
whereas the model of Definition 1 seemingly requires unbounded simulation-soundness. Indeed, when
the evaluation oracle is queried on input of a derivative of the challenge ciphertext in the security
proof, the homomorphic operation may result in a ciphertext containing a vector outside the language
Lρ. Since the oracle has to simulate a proof for this vector, each homomorphic evaluation can carry
a proof for a potentially false statement. In some sense, each output of the evaluation oracle can be
seen as yet another challenge ciphertext. In this setting, our efficient unbounded simulation-sound
QA-NIZK proof system comes in handy.
It remains to make sure that CCA1 security is always preserved, should the adversary obtain the
evaluation key SKh at the outset of the game. To this end, we include a second derived one-time
homomorphic signature (Z,R,U) in the ciphertext without including its private key in SKh.
Keygen(λ, t,N): Choose bilinear groups (G,GT ) of prime order p > 2
λ. Then, do the following.
1. Pick f, g, h R← G, x0, x1, x2
R← Zp and set X1 = f
x1gx0 ∈ G, X2 = h
x2gx0 ∈ G. Then, define
f = (f, 1, g) ∈ G3 and h = (1, h, g) ∈ G3.
2. Choose random polynomials P1[Z], P2[Z], P [Z] ∈ Zp[Z] of degree t− 1 such that P1(0) = x1,
P2(0) = x2 and P (0) = x0. For each i ∈ {1, . . . , N}, compute V Ki = (Yi,1, Yi,2) where
Yi,1 = f
P1(i)gP (i) and Yi,2 = h
P2(i)gP (i).
3. Choose fr,1, fr,2
R← G in order to define vectors f r,1 = (fr,1, 1, g), f r,2 = (1, fr,2, g) and
f r,3 = f
φ1
r,1 · f
φ2
r,2 · (1, 1, g)
−1, where φ1, φ2
R← Zp. These vectors will be used as a Groth-Sahai
CRS for the generation of NIZK proofs showing the validity of decryption shares.
4. Choose a strongly unforgeable one-time signature Σ = (G,S,V) with verification keys consist-
ing of L-bit strings, for some L ∈ poly(λ).
5. Generate a key pair for the one-time linearly homomorphic structure-preserving signature of
Section 2.5 with n = 3. Let pkot =
(
Gz, Gr, Hz, Hu, {(Gi, Hi)}
3
i=1
)
be the public key and let
skot = {(ϕi, ϑi, ̟i)}
3
i=1 be the corresponding private key.
6. Generate one-time homomorphic signatures {(Zj , Rj , Uj)}j=1,2 on the vectors f = (f, 1, g)
and h = (1, h, g). These signatures consist of (Z1, R1, U1) =
(
f−ϕ1g−ϕ3 , f−ϑ1g−ϑ3 , f−̟1g−̟3
)
and (Z2, R2, U2) =
(
h−ϕ2g−ϕ3 , h−ϑ2g−ϑ3 , h−̟2g−̟3
)
and erase skot.
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7. Generate a key pair (pkrand, skrand) as in step 1 of the proof system in Section 3 with n = 3.
Let skrand = {(χi, γi, δi)}
3
i=1 be the private key for which the corresponding public key is
pkrand =
(
gz, gr, hz, hu, {(gi, hi)}
3
i=1, f =
(
f1,f2, {f3,i}
L
i=0
) )
.
8. Use skrand to generate one-time linearly homomorphic signatures {(zj , rj , uj)}j=1,2 on the
independent vectors f = (f, 1, g) ∈ G3 and h = (1, h, g) ∈ G3. These are obtained as
(z1, r1, u1) =
(
f−χ1g−χ3 , f−γ1g−γ3 , f−δ1g−δ3
)
, (z2, r2, u2) =
(
h−χ2g−χ3 , h−γ2g−γ3 , h−δ2g−δ3
)
.
9. The public key is defined to be
PK =
(
g, f , h, f r,1, f r,2, f r,3, X1, X2, pkot, pkrand, {(Zj , Rj , Uj)}
2
j=1 {(zj , rj , uj)}
2
j=1
)
.
The evaluation key is SKh = skrand = {(χi, γi, δi)}
3
i=1 while the i-th decryption key share
is defined to be SKd,i = (P1(i), P2(i), P (i)). The vector of verification keys is defined as
VK = (V K1, . . . , V KN ), where V Ki = (Yi,1, Yi,2) for i = 1 to N .
Encrypt(M,PK): to encrypt M ∈ G, generate a one-time signature key pair (SVK, SSK)← G(λ).
1. Choose θ1, θ2
R← Zp and compute
C0 =M ·X
θ1
1 ·X
θ2
2 , C1 = f
θ1 , C2 = h
θ2 , C3 = g
θ1+θ2 .
2. Construct a first linearly homomorphic signature (Z,R,U) on the vector (C1, C2, C3) ∈ G
3.
Namely, compute Z = Zθ11 · Z
θ2
2 , R = R
θ1
1 ·R
θ2
2 and U = U
θ1
1 · U
θ2
2 .
3. Using {(zj , rj , uj)}j=1,2, derive another homomorphic signature (z, r, u) on (C1, C2, C3). Namely,
compute z = zθ11 · z
θ2
2 , r = r
θ1
1 · r
θ2
2 and u = u
θ1
1 · u
θ2
2 .
4. Using SVK = SVK[1] . . . SVK[L] ∈ {0, 1}L, define the vector fSVK = f3,0 ·
∏L
i=1 f
SVK[i]
3,i and
assemble a Groth-Sahai CRS fSVK = (f1,f2,fSVK). Using fSVK, generate commitments Cz,
Cr, Cu to the components of (z, r, u) ∈ G
3 along with proofs (pi1,pi2) as in step 2 of the
proving algorithm of Section 3. Let (Cz,Cr,Cu,pi1,pi2) ∈ G
15 be the resulting NIWI proof.
5. Generate σ = S(SSK, (C0, C1, C2, C3, Z,R, U,Cz,Cr,Cu,pi1,pi2)) and output
C = (SVK, C0, C1, C2, C3, Z,R, U,Cz,Cr,Cu,pi1,pi2, σ) (3)
Ciphertext-Verify
(
PK,C
)
: parse C as in (3). Return 1 if and only if these conditions are satisfied:
(i) V(SVK, (C0, C1, C2, C3, Z,R, U,Cz,Cr,Cu,pi1,pi2), σ) = 1; (ii) (Z,R,U) ∈ G
3 is a valid homo-
morphic signature on (C1, C2, C3); (iii) (Cz,Cr,Cu,pi1,pi2) ∈ G
15 is a valid proof w.r.t. the CRS
(f1,f2,fSVK) that committed (z, r, u) satisfy the relations (1) for the vector (C1, C2, C3) ∈ G
3.
Here, we define fSVK = f3,0 ·
∏L
i=1 f
SVK[i]
3,i .
Share-Decrypt(PK, i, SKd,i, C): on inputs SKd,i = (P1(i), P2(i), P (i)) ∈ Z
3
p and C, return (i,⊥)
if Ciphertext-Verify
(
PK,C
)
= 0. Otherwise, compute µˆi =
(
νi,CP1 ,CP2 ,CP , πµi
)
which con-
sists of a partial decryption νi = C
P1(i)
1 · C
P2(i)
2 · C
P (i)
3 as well as commitments CP1 ,CP2 ,CP to
exponents P1(i), P2(i), P (i) ∈ Zp and a proof πνi that these satisfy the equations
νi = C
P1(i)
1 · C
P2(i)
2 · C
P (i)
3 , Yi,1 = f
P1(i)gP (i), Yi,2 = h
P2(i)gP (i).
The commitments CP1 ,CP2 ,CP and the proof πνi are generated using the CRS (f r,1,f r,2,f r,3)
(see Appendix A for details). Then, return µi = (i, µˆi).
Share-Verify
(
PK, V Ki, C, (i, µˆi)
)
: parse C as in (3) and V Ki as (Yi,1, Yi,2). If µˆi = ⊥ or µˆi cannot
be parsed as
(
νi,CP1 ,CP2 ,CP , πµi
)
, return 0. Otherwise, return 1 if and only if πµi is valid.
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Combine(PK,VK, C, {(i, µˆi)}i∈S): for each i ∈ S, parse the share µˆi as
(
νi,CP1 ,CP2 ,CP , πµi
)
and return ⊥ if Share-Verify
(
PK,C, (i, µˆi)
)
= 0. Otherwise, compute ν =
∏
i∈S ν
∆i,S(0)
i , which
equals ν = Cx11 · C
x2
2 · C
x0
3 = X
θ1
1 ·X
θ2
2 and in turn reveals M = C0/ν.
Eval(PK,SKh, C
(1), C(2)): parse SKh as {(χi, γi, δi)}
3
i=1. For each j ∈ {1, 2}, parse C
(j) as
C(j) = (SVK(j), C
(j)
0 , C
(j)
1 , C
(j)
2 , C
(j)
3 , Z
(j), R(j), U (j),C(j)z ,C
(j)
r ,C
(j)
u ,pi
(j)
1 ,pi
(j)
2 , σ
(j))
and return ⊥ if either C(1) or C(2) is invalid. Otherwise,
1. Compute C0 =
∏2
j=1C
(j)
0 , C1 =
∏2
j=1C
(j)
1 , C2 =
∏2
j=1C
(j)
2 and C3 =
∏2
j=1C
(j)
3 as well as
Z =
∏2
j=1 Z
(j), R =
∏2
j=1R
(j) and U =
∏2
j=1 U
(j).
2. Generate a new one-time signature key pair (SVK, SSK)← G(λ). Using SKh = {(χi, γi, δi)}
3
i=1,
generate proof elements Cz,Cr,Cu,pi1,pi2 on the vector (C1, C2, C3) using the simulator of
the proof system in Section 3 with the one-time verification key SVK.
3. Return the derived ciphertext C = (SVK, C0, C1, C2, C3, Z,R, U,Cz,Cr,Cu,pi1,pi2, σ) where
σ = S(SSK, (C0, C1, C2, C3, Z,R, U,Cz,Cr,Cu,pi1,pi2)).
In Appendix H, we prove the KH-CCA security of the scheme assuming that Σ is a strongly unforge-
able one-time signature and that the DLIN assumption holds in G.
In some applications, it may be desirable to add an extra randomization step to the evaluation
algorithm in order to make sure that derived ciphertexts will be indistinguishable from freshly gener-
ated encryption (similarly to [48]). It is straightforward to modify the scheme to obtain this property.
If the scheme is instantiated using Groth’s one-time signature [32], the ciphertext consists of 25 ele-
ments of G and two elements of Zp. It is interesting to compare the above system with an instantiation
of the same design principle using the best known Groth-Sahai-based unbounded simulation-sound
proof [15][Appendix A.2], which requires 65 group elements in this specific case. With this proof sys-
tem, we end up with 77 group elements per ciphertexts under the DLIN assumption (assuming that
an element of Zp has the same length as the representation of a group element). The above realization
thus saves 50 group elements and compresses ciphertexts to 35% of their original length.
We note that it is possible to adapt the scheme to rely on the Symmetric eXternal Diffie-Hellman
assumption in asymmetric pairings e : G× Gˆ→ GT . In this case, the ciphertext contains 9 elements
of G, 2 elements of Gˆ and a one-time key pair (SVK, σ). Using the one-time signature of [32], the
ciphertext overhead amounts to 4096 bits on Barreto-Naehrig curves [4] if each element of G (resp.
each element of Gˆ) has a 256-bit (resp. 512-bit) representation.
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A Groth-Sahai Proofs
In the notations of this section, when vectors A and B are vectors of group elements, A ·B denotes
their entry-wise product.
Under the DLIN assumption in symmetric bilinear groups (G,GT ), the Groth-Sahai (GS) proof
systems [33] use a CRS consisting of three vectors g1, g2, g3 ∈ G
3, where g1 = (g1, 1, g), g2 = (1, g2, g)
for some g1, g2 ∈R G. In this setting, a commitment to a group element X ∈ G is computed as
C = (1, 1, X) · g1
r · g2
s · g3
t with r, s, t R← Z∗p. In order to obtain perfectly sound proofs, g3 is chosen
as g3 = g1
ξ1 · g2
ξ2 , with ξ1, ξ2
R← Z∗p, so that the commitment C = (g
r+ξ1t
1 , g
s+ξ2t
2 , X · g
r+s+t(ξ1+ξ2))
is extractable as it is distributed as a Boneh-Boyen-Shacham (BBS) ciphertext [10] that can be
decrypted using the discrete logarithms α1 = logg(g1), α2 = logg(g2). In order to switch to the
witness indistinguishability setting, the vectors g1, g2, g3 must be linearly independent so as to span
the entire space where C lives and make sure that C is a perfectly hiding commitment. Under the
DLIN assumption, the two kinds of reference strings are computationally indistinguishable.
When it comes to commit to an exponent x ∈ Zp, the prover computes C = ϕ
x · gr1 · g
s
2, with
r, s R← Z∗p, using a CRS comprising vectors ϕ, g1, g2. In the soundness setting ϕ, g1, g2 are linearly
independent vectors while, in the perfect WI setting, choosing ϕ in span(g1, g2) yields a perfectly
hiding commitment as C is always a BBS encryption of 1G.
To prove that committed group elements or exponents satisfy certain relations, the Groth-Sahai
methodology [33] requires one commitment per variable and one proof element per relation. Efficient
NIWI proofs are available for multi-exponentiation equations of the form
m∏
i=1
Ayii ·
n∏
j=1
X
bj
j ·
m∏
i=1
·
n∏
j=1
X
yiγij
j = T,
for variables X1, . . . ,Xn ∈ G, y1, . . . , ym ∈ Zp and constants T,A1, . . . ,Am ∈ G, b1, . . . , bn ∈ Zp and
γij ∈ Zp, for i ∈ {1, . . . ,m}, j ∈ {1, . . . , n}.
For linear equations (i.e., where γij = 0 for all i, j) depends on the form of the considered equation.
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Namely, linear multi-exponentiation equations of the type
∏n
j=1X
bj
j = T (resp.
∏m
i=1A
yi
i = T )
demand 3 (resp. 2) group elements.
Multi-exponentiation equations admit NIZK proofs. On a simulated CRS, the representation
(ξ1, ξ2) ∈ Z
2
p of ϕ as ϕ = g
ξ1
1 ·g
ξ2
2 can serve as a trapdoor that makes it possible to perfectly simulate
proofs without knowing the witnesses.
Efficient NIWI proofs also exist for pairing-product relations, which are the form
n∏
i=1
e(Ai,Xi) ·
n∏
i=1
·
n∏
j=1
e(Xi,Xj)
aij = tT ,
for variables X1, . . . ,Xn ∈ G and constants tT ∈ GT , A1, . . . ,An ∈ G, aij ∈ Zp, for i, j ∈ {1, . . . , n}.
For each linear pairing product equation (where aij = 0 for all i, j), a proof fits within 3 group
elements. Quadratic equations are somewhat more space-consuming and take 9 group elements each.
At the cost of introducing extra variables, pairing product equations can also have NIZK proofs.
B Definitions for Linearly Homomorphic Structure-Preserving Signatures
Let (G,GT ) be groups of prime order p such that a bilinear map e : G × G → GT can be efficiently
computed.
A signature scheme is structure-preserving [3, 2] if messages, signatures and public keys all live in
the group G. In linearly homomorphic structure-preserving signatures, the message spaceM consists
of pairs M := T × Gn, for some n ∈ N, where T is a tag space. Depending on the application, one
may want the tags to be group elements or not. In this paper, they can be arbitrary strings.
Definition 4. A linearly homomorphic structure-preserving signature scheme over (G,GT ) is a tuple
of efficient algorithms Σ = (Keygen, Sign, SignDerive,Verify) for which the message space consists of
M := T ×Gn, for some integer n ∈ poly(λ) and some set T , and with the following specifications.
Keygen(λ, n): is a randomized algorithm that takes in a security parameter λ ∈ N and an integer
n ∈ poly(λ) denoting the dimension of vectors to be signed. It outputs a key pair (pk, sk), where
pk includes the description of a tag space T , where each tag serves as a file identifier.
Sign(sk, τ,M): is a possibly randomized algorithm that takes as input a private key sk, a file identifier
τ ∈ T and a vector M = (M1, . . . ,Mn) ∈ G
n. It outputs a signature σ ∈ Gns, for some ns ∈
poly(λ).
SignDerive(pk, τ, {(ωi, σ
(i))}ℓ
i=1): is a (possibly randomized) derivation algorithm. It inputs a pub-
lic key pk, a file identifier τ as well as ℓ pairs (ωi, σ
(i)), each of which consists of a coefficient
ωi ∈ Zp and a signature σ
(i) ∈ Gns. It outputs a signature σ ∈ Gns on the vectorM =
∏ℓ
i=1M
ωi
i ,
where σ(i) is a signature on M i.
Verify(pk, τ,M, σ): is a deterministic verification algorithm that takes as input a public key pk, a
file identifier τ ∈ T , a signature σ and a vector M = (M1, . . . ,Mn). It outputs 0 or 1 depending
on whether σ is deemed valid or not.
In a one-time linearly homomorphic SPS, the tag τ can be omitted in the specification as a given
key pair (pk, sk) only allows signing one linear subspace.
As in all linearly homomorphic signatures, the security requirement is that the adversary be unable
to create a valid triple (τ⋆,M⋆, σ⋆) for a new file identifier τ⋆ or, if τ⋆ is recycled from one or more
honestly generated signatures, for a vector M⋆ outside the linear span of the vectors that have been
legitimately signed for the tag τ⋆.
An important property is that the SignDerive algorithm must operate on vectors that are all
labeled with the same tag.
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C Randomizable Linearly Homomorphic Structure-Preserving Signatures
This section recalls the randomizable linearly homomorphic structure-preserving signature of [43].
In the scheme, each signature basically consists of a Groth-Sahai NIWI proof of knowledge of a
one-time signature (z, r, u) on the signed vector (M1, . . . ,Mn). This proof of knowledge is generated
for a Groth-Sahai CRS which depends on the tag that identifies the subspace being signed.
In the following notations, for each h ∈ G and any vector g = (g1, g2, g3) ∈ G
3, we denote by
E(h, g) the vector (e(h, g1), e(h, g2), e(h, g3)) ∈ G
3
T .
Keygen(λ, n): given a security parameter λ and the dimension n ∈ N of the subspace to be signed,
choose bilinear group (G,GT ) of order p > 2
λ with a generator g R← G as well as gz, gr, hz, hu
R← G
and do the following.
1. For i = 1 to n, pick χi, γi, δi
R← Zp and compute gi = gz
χigr
γi and hi = hz
χihu
δi .
2. Generate L+1 Groth-Sahai common reference strings, where L ∈ poly(λ) is the length of each
tag τ ∈ T = {0, 1}L. To this end, choose f1, f2
R← G and define vectors f1 = (f1, 1, g) ∈ G
3,
f2 = (1, f2, g) ∈ G
3. Then, pick f3,i
R← G3 for i = 0 to L.
The public key consists of
pk =
(
(G,GT ), gz, gr, hz, hu, {gi, hi}
n
i=1, f =
(
f1,f2, {f3,i}
L
i=0
) )
while the private key is sk =
(
hz
αr , {χi, γi, δi}
n
i=1
)
.
Sign(sk, τ, (M1, . . . ,Mn)): to sign a vector (M1, . . . ,Mn) ∈ G
n using sk =
(
hz
αr , {χi, γi, δi}
n
i=1
)
with the file identifier τ , conduct the following steps.
1. Choose θ R← Zp at random and compute z = gr
θ ·
∏n
i=1M
−χi
i , r = gz
−θ ·
∏n
i=1M
−γi
i and
u = hz
−θ·αr ·
∏n
i=1M
−δi
i .
2. Using the bits τ [1] . . . τ [L] of τ ∈ {0, 1}L, define the vector f τ = f3,0 ·
∏L
i=1 f
τ [i]
3,i so as to
assemble a Groth-Sahai CRS fτ = (f1,f2,f τ ).
3. Using fτ = (f1,f2,f τ ), compute commitments Cz = (1G, 1G, z) · f
νz,1
1 · f
νz,2
2 · f
νz,3
τ and
Cr = (1G, 1G, r) · f
νr,1
1 · f
νr,2
2 · f
νr,3
τ Cu = (1G, 1G, u) · f
νu,1
1 · f
νu,2
2 · f
νu,3
τ
to the derived z, r and u, respectively. Generate NIWI proofs pi1 = (π1,1, π1,2, π1,3) ∈ G
3 and
pi2 = (π2,1, π2,2, π2,3) ∈ G
3 that (z, r, u) satisfy the verification equations
1GT = e(gz, z) · e(gr, r) ·
n∏
i=1
e(gi,Mi) 1GT = e(hz, z) · e(hu, u) ·
n∏
i=1
e(hi,Mi).
These proofs are obtained as
pi1 = (π1,1, π1,2, π1,3) =
(
gz
−νz,1 · gr
−νr,1 , gz
−νz,2 · gr
−νr,2 , gz
−νz,3 · gr
−νr,3
)
pi2 = (π2,1, π2,2, π2,3) =
(
hz
−νz,1 · hu
−νu,1 , hz
−νz,2 · hu
−νu,2 , hz
−νz,3 · hu
−νu,3
)
.
The signature consists of σ = (Cz,Cr,Cu,pi1,pi2) ∈ G
15.
SignDerive(pk, τ, {(ωi, σ
(i))}ℓ
i=1): given pk, a file identifier τ and ℓ tuples (ωi, σ
(i)), parse each
signature σ(i) as a tuple of the form σ(i) = (Cz,i,Cr,i,Cu,i,pi1,i,pi2,i) ∈ G
15 for i = 1 to ℓ.
1. Compute Cz =
∏ℓ
i=1C
ωi
z,i , Cr =
∏ ℓ
i=1C
ωi
r,i , Cu =
∏ℓ
i=1C
ωi
u,i , pi1 =
∏ℓ
i=1 pi
ωi
1,i as well as
pi2 =
∏ℓ
i=1 pi
ωi
2,i .
2. Re-randomize the above commitments and proofs and return σ = (Cz,Cr,Cu,pi1,pi2).
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Verify(pk, σ, τ, (M1, . . . ,Mn)): given (τ, (M1, . . . ,Mn)) and a purported signature σ, parse σ as
(Cz,Cr,Cu,pi1,pi2). Return 1 iff (M1, . . . ,Mn) 6= (1G, . . . , 1G) and the proofs (pi1,pi2) satisfy
n∏
i=1
E
(
gi, (1G, 1G,Mi)
)−1
= E
(
gz,Cz
)
· E
(
gr,Cr
)
· E(π1,1,f1) · E(π1,2,f2) · E(π1,3,f τ ) (4)
n∏
i=1
E
(
hi, (1G, 1G,Mi)
)−1
= E
(
hz,Cz
)
· E
(
hu,Cu
)
· E(π2,1,f1) · E(π2,2,f2) · E(π2,3,f τ ).
We remark that the scheme can be simplified by setting θ = 0 in all algorithms: since all non-
interactive proofs are generated for a perfectly NIWI Groth-Sahai CRS, this modification does not
affect the distribution of signatures whatsoever. In Sections 3 and 5, we use this simplified version of
the scheme.
The scheme is only known [43] to be secure in a relaxed model where the adversary is only deemed
successful if it additionally provides evidence that its output vector is indeed independent of those
for which it obtained signatures with respect to the target tag τ⋆. In our applications, this restriction
will not be a problem at all since, in all security proofs, the reduction will always be able to detect
when the adversary has won without requiring explicit evidence for it.
D Extensions Based on the k-Linear Assumption
To instantiate our proof systems using the k-linear assumption with k > 2, we first need to extend
the one-time linearly homomorphic structure-preserving signature of [43]. To this end, we need to
define the following assumption which is implied by the k-linear assumption in the same way as SDP
is implied by DLIN.
Definition 5. The Simultaneous k-wise Pairing (k-SDP) problem is, given a random tuple
(g1,z, . . . , gk,z, g1,r, . . . , gk,r) ∈R G
2k,
to find a non-trivial vector (z, r1, . . . , rk) ∈ G
k+1 such that
e(gj,z, z) · e(gj,r, rj) = 1GT j ∈ {1, . . . , k} (5)
and z 6= 1G.
Given a k-linear instance (g1,r, . . . , gk,r, g
a1
1,r, . . . , g
ak
k,r, η) ∈ G
2k+1, for any non-trivial tuple (z, r1, . . . , rk)
satisfying e(g
aj
j,r, z) · e(gj,r, rj) = 1GT for each j ∈ {1, . . . , k}, we have
η = g
∑k
j=1 aj ⇔ e(g,
k∏
j=1
rj) · e(z, η) = 1GT .
Hence, any algorithm solving k-SDP with non-negligible probability implies a k-linear distinguisher.
Under the k-SDP assumption, the one-time linearly homomorphic structure-preserving signature
of [43] can be extended as follows.
Keygen(λ, n): given a security parameter λ and the dimension n ∈ N of vectors to be signed, choose
bilinear group (G,GT ) of prime order p > 2
λ. For j = 1 to k, choose generators gj,z, gj,r
R← G.
Then, for each i = 1 to n, j = 1 to k, pick χi
R← Zp , γj,i
R← Zp and compute gj,i = gj,z
χigj,r
γj,i .
The private key is sk =
(
{χi, {γj,i}
k
j=1}
n
i=1
)
while the public key is
pk =
(
{gj,z, gj,r, {gj,i}
n
i=1}
k
j=1
)
.
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Sign(sk, (M1, . . . ,Mn)): to sign (M1, . . . ,Mn) ∈ G
n using sk =
(
{χi, {γj,i}
k
j=1}
n
i=1
)
, compute and
output σ = (z, r1, . . . , rk) ∈ G
k+1, where
z =
n∏
i=1
M−χii ,
rj =
n∏
i=1
M
−γj,i
i j ∈ {1, . . . , k}.
SignDerive(pk, {(ωi, σ
(i))}ℓ
i=1): given a public key pk and ℓ tuples (ωi, σ
(i)), where ωi ∈ Zp for
each i, parse σ(i) as σ(i) =
(
zi, ri,1, . . . , ri,k
)
∈ Gk+1 for i = 1 to ℓ. Then, compute and return
σ = (z, r1, . . . , rk), where z =
∏ℓ
i=1 z
ωi
i , rj =
∏ℓ
i=1 r
ωi
i,j for j = 1 to k.
Verify(pk, σ, (M1, . . . ,Mn)): given σ = (z, r1, . . . , rk) ∈ G
k+1 and (M1, . . . ,Mn), return 1 if and
only if (M1, . . . ,Mn) 6= (1G, . . . , 1G) and, for each j ∈ {1, . . . , k}, the following equality holds:
1GT = e(gj,z, z) · e(gj,r, rj) ·
n∏
i=1
e(gj,i,Mi). (6)
In order to adapt the unbounded simulation-sound proof system of Section 3, we need to commit
to the components of (z, r1, . . . , rk) and NIWI arguments showing that committed group elements
satisfy the pairing product equations (6). Under the k-linear assumption, committing to a group
element requires k + 1 group elements (see, e.g., [15] for details) whereas each equation of the form
(6) costs k+1 elements to prove. Overall, we thus need (k+1)(2k+1) group elements and a one-time
verification key pair (SVK, σ).
In the relatively-sound QA-NIZK proof of Section 4, the proof element π0 remains unchanged
and we simply need to replace the triple (z, r, u) by a one-time linearly homomorphic signature
(z, r1, . . . , rk). Hence, we only need k + 2 group elements.
E Comparisons
This section compares the various NIZK proofs of linear subspace membership based on the DLIN
assumption. Comparisons are given in terms of CRS size, proof size, the number of pairing evaluations
for the verifier and the need for a computational assumption to prove the soundness property.
In the table, we consider our basic proof system (without any form of simulation-soundness, where
each proof is a one-time linearly homomorphic signature (z, r, u)), its unbounded simulation-sound
variant and the relatively simulation-sound variant of Section 4. We compare these with the original
Groth-Sahai proofs, their most efficient unbounded simulation-sound extensions due to Camenisch et
al. [15] and the Jutla-Roy techniques [38] with and without relative soundness.
Table 1. Comparison between proof systems for linear subspaces
Proof systems CRS size♦ ∗ Proof length♦ # of pairings† Soundness
at verification property
Groth-Sahai [33] 6 3t+ 2n 3n(t+ 3) perfect
Jutla-Roy [38] 4t(n− t) + 3 2(n− t) 2(n-t)(t+2) computational
Jutla-Roy RSS [38] + [37] 4t(n+ 1− t) + 3 2(n+ 1− t) + 1 2(n+ 1− t)(t+ 2) computational
Groth-Sahai USS [15] 18 6t+ 2n+ 52‡ O(tn) computational
Our basic QA-NIZK proofs 2n+ 3t+ 4 3 2n+ 2 computational
Our RSS QA-NIZK proofs 4n+ 8t+ 6 4 2n+ 6 computational
Our USS QA-NIZK proofs 2n+ 3t+ 3L+ 10 20‡ 2n+ 30 computational
n: number of equations; t: number of variables; L: length of a hashed one-time verification key
♦ These sizes are measured in terms of number of group elements.
∗ The description ρ ∈ Gt×n of the language is not counted as being part of the CRS here.
† The table does not consider optimizations using randomized batch verification techniques here.
‡ We consider instantiations using Groth’s one-time signature [32], where verification keys and signatures consist of 3
group elements and two elements of Zp, respectively.
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As can be observed in the table, our constructions all yield constant-size arguments. Moreover, the
number of pairing evaluations is always independent of the number of variables t, which substantially
fastens the verification process when t ≈ n/2.
We also note that randomized batch verification techniques can be used to drastically reduce the
number of pairing computations. In our USS system, for example, the number of pairings drops to
n+18 if the two verification equations are processed together and further optimizations are possible.
Our common reference strings always fit within O(t + n) group elements (with another O(L)
elements in the USS variant) and thus provide significant savings w.r.t. [38] when t ≈ n/2.
F Proof of Theorem 1
Proof. The quasi-adaptive completeness property follows directly from the correctness of the ran-
domizable linearly homomorphic signature of Section 2.5. We thus focus on the quasi-adaptive zero-
knowledge and quasi-adaptive unbounded simulation-soundness properties.
Quasi-Adaptive Zero-Knowledge. To prove this property we consider a sequence of two games
which begins with a game where the adversary has access to a real prover P on a real CRS ψ. In the
second game, the adversary will be faced with a simulator (S1, S2).
Game1: is a game where the adversary A is given the description of the language Lρ and is granted
access to a real CRS ψ and an actual prover P(ψ, ., .) which takes as input a vector v along with
a witness x ∈ Ztp such that v = g
x·A. At each invocation, the oracle outputs a genuine proof π by
running the legal P algorithm. The adversary is allowed to query P(ψ, ., .) a polynomial number
of times and eventually outputs a bit β ∈ {0, 1}. We denote by S1 the event that β = 1.
Game2: This game is identical to Game2 with the difference that, when the P(ψ, ., .) oracle is queried
on a pair (v,x), it does not use the witness x ∈ Ztp anymore at step 1 of the proving algorithm.
Instead, it uses the the private key skrand = {(χi, γi, δi)}
n
i=1 to compute a one-time signature
(z, r, u) =
(∏n
j=1 v
−χj
j ,
∏n
j=1 v
−γj
j ,
∏n
j=1 v
−δj
j ) on the vector v = (v1, . . . , vn) ∈ G
n. The remaining
parts of π are generated as in the real P(ψ, ., .) oracle in steps 2 and 3 of the proof generation
algorithm. Although, the witness x ∈ Ztp is never used, it is easy to see that (z, r, u) has exactly
the same distribution as in Game2 if v ∈ Lρ (i.e., as long as v = g
x·A for some x ∈ Ztp). We thus
have Pr[S2] = Pr[S1].
We define the simulator (S1, S2) by having S1 generate the CRS ψ as in Game1 (so that ψ has the
same distribution as the real CRS) and letting S2 generate proofs without using the witnesses as in
Game2. It easily comes that the system is perfectly quasi-adaptive zero-knowledge as, for all language
members v ∈ Gn, simulated proofs are distributed as real proofs.
Quasi-Adaptive Unbounded Simulation-Soundness. To prove this property, we proceed again
with a sequence of games.
Game1: is the real game where the adversary A is given the description of the language Lρ and is
granted access to a simulated CRS ψ and a simulated prover S2(ψ, τsim, ., .) which takes as input
a vector-label pair (v, lbl) and returns a simulated proof π that v ∈ Lρ. To generate ρ ∈ G
t×n
according to the distributionDΓ , the challenger generates a matrixA ∈ Z
t×n
p with the appropriate
distribution (recall that DΓ is efficiently samplable by hypothesis) and computes ρ = g
A. In
addition, the challenger B computes a basisW ∈ Z
n×(n−t)
p of the right kernel ofA and retains it for
later use. The adversary is allowed to query the simulated prover S2(ψ, τsim, ., .) on polynomially
many occasions. The game ends with the adversary A outputting an element v⋆, a proof π⋆ and
a label lbl⋆. The adversary is deemed successful if v⋆ 6∈ Lρ (i.e., v
⋆ is not in the row space of
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ρ ∈ Gt×n) but (π⋆, lbl⋆) is a valid proof. We denote by S1 the latter event, which B can recognize
by testing if v = (v1, . . . , vn) ∈ G
n satisfies
∏n
j=1 v
wji
j = 1G for each column w
⊤
i = (w1i, . . . , wni)
⊤
of W. Indeed, the vectors y ∈ Znp in the row space of A are exactly those for which y ·W = 0.
Game2: This game is identical to Game1 but the challenger B aborts if the adversary A outputs
a fake proof π⋆ that recycles one of the one-time verification keys appearing in outputs of
the S2(ψ, τsim, ., .) oracle. Clearly, Game2 and Game1 are identical until the latter event occurs
and this event contradicts the strong unforgeability of Σ: if q denotes the number of queries to
S2(ψ, τsim, ., .), a standard argument shows that |Pr[S2]− Pr[S1]| ≤ q ·Adv
suf-ots(B).
Game3: This game is identical to Game2 but we modify the generation of pkrand when the public
key is set up. Namely, the vectors (f1,f2, {f3,i}
L
i=0) are chosen by setting f1 = (f1, 1G, g) and
f2 = (1G, f2, g) where f1, f2
R← G are chosen at random. As for {f3,i}
L
i=0, they are obtained as
f3,0 = f
ξ0,1
1 · f
ξ0,2
2 · (1, 1, g)
ξ0,3 · (1, 1, g)µ·ζ−ρ0 (7)
f3,i = f
ξi,1
1 · f
ξi,2
2 · (1, 1, g)
ξi,3 · (1, 1, g)−ρi , i ∈ {1, . . . , L}
with µ R← {0, . . . , L}, ξ0,1, ξ1,1, . . . , ξL,1
R← Zp, ξ0,2, ξ1,2, . . . , ξL,2
R← Zp, ξ0,3, ξ1,3, . . . , ξL,3
R← Zp and
ρ0, ρ1, . . . , ρL
R← {0, . . . , ζ − 1}, with ζ = 2(q + 1) and where q is the number of queries to the
S2(ψ, τsim, .) oracle. Note that this change is only conceptual since the distribution of {f3,i}
L
i=0
has not changed since Game2. We thus have Pr[S3] = Pr[S2].
Game4: This game is like Game3 but we consider an event Good which causes the challenger B to
abort if it does not occur. Let SVK1, . . . , SVKq be the distinct one-time verification keys appearing
in outputs of the S2 oracle throughout the game. Let also SVK
⋆ be the verification key involved in
the fake proof π⋆ produced by A. We know that SVK⋆ 6∈ {SVK1, . . . , SVKq} unless the failure event
introduced in Game2 occurs. For each verification key SVK ∈ {0, 1}
L, we consider the function
J(SVK) = µ · ζ − ρ0 −
∑L
i=1 ρi · SVK[i], where {ρi}
L
i=0 are the values internally defined by the
simulator in Game3. We also define Good to be the event that
J(SVK⋆) = 0 ∧
∧
j∈{1,...,q}
J(SVKj) 6= 0. (8)
We remark that the random exponents ρ0, ρ1, . . . , ρL are chosen independently of A’s view: this
means that the simulator could equivalently define {f3,i}
L
i=0 first and only choose {ρi}
L
i=0 –
together with values {ξ3,i}
L
i=0 explaining the {f3,i}
L
i=0 – at the very end of the game, when
SVK⋆, SVK1, . . . , SVKq, SVK have been defined. The same analysis as [54] (using the simplifications
of Bellare and Ristenpart [6, Theorem 3.1]) shows that Pr[S4∧Good] ≥ Pr[S3]
2/(27·(q+1)·(L+1)).
This follows from the fact that, for any set of queries, a lower bound on the probability of event
Good is 1/(2q(L+1)). Indeed, from the known results [54, 35] on the programmability of Waters’
hash function, we know that the probability, taken over the choice of (µ, ρ0, . . . , ρL), to meet the
conditions (8) is at least 1/(2q(L+ 1)).
Game5: We modify again the way to compute pkrand in the generation of the public key. Namely,
the vectors f1 = (f1, 1G, g), f2 = (1G, f2, g) are chosen as before. However, instead of generating
{f3,i}
L
i=0 as in Game4, we set them as
f3,0 = f
ξ0,1
1 · f
ξ0,2
2 · (1, 1, g)
µ·ζ−ρ0 (9)
f3,i = f
ξi,1
1 · f
ξi,2
2 · (1, 1, g)
−ρi , i ∈ {1, . . . , L}
which amounts to setting ξ0,3 = ξ1,3 = . . . = ξL,3 = 0. Clearly, {f3,i}
L
i=0 are no longer uniform
in the span of
(
f1,f2, (1, 1, g)
)
. Still, this change should not be noticeable to A if the DLIN
assumption holds in G. Concretely, if the adversary wins (recall that the challenger can still detect
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this event using the matrix W ∈ Z
n×(n−t)
p as explained in Game1) with substantially different
probabilities in Game5 and Game4, we can construct a DLIN distinguisher B
DLIN in the group
G. This distinguisher uses the random self-reducibility of DLIN to construct many independent-
looking instances from the same distribution out of a given instance. The distinguisher then runs
A on input of the CRS that was generated using the DLIN instances and it eventually outputs 1
if the adversary wins. We can thus write |Pr[S5 ∧ Good]− Pr[S4 ∧ Good]| ≤ AdvBDLIN(λ).
In Game5, we show that a successful adversary implies an algorithm B solving a given SDP instance
(gz, gr, hz, hu) with non-negligible probability, which a fortiori breaks the DLIN assumption in G.
By hypothesis, we know that A manages to create a proof π⋆ = (SVK⋆,C⋆z,C
⋆
r ,C
⋆
u,pi
⋆
1,pi
⋆
2, σ
⋆)
for a vector v⋆ = (v⋆1, . . . , v
⋆
n) outside the row space of ρ but (C
⋆
z,C
⋆
r ,C
⋆
u,pi
⋆
1,pi
⋆
2) ∈ G
15 and σ⋆
satisfy the verification equations. At this point, if the event Good introduced in Game4 occurs, we
must have J(SVK⋆) = 0, which implies that fSVK⋆ = f3,0 ·
∏L+1
i=1 f
SVK
⋆[i]
3,i lies in span(f1,f2).
Consequently, C⋆z, C
⋆
r and C
⋆
u are necessarily perfectly binding and extractable commitments. Using
(logg(f1), logg(f2)), algorithm B can thus extract the committed group elements (z
⋆, r⋆, u⋆) ∈ G3 by
BBS-decrypting the ciphertexts (C⋆z,C
⋆
r ,C
⋆
u). Since (pi
⋆
1,pi
⋆
2) are perfectly sound Groth-Sahai proofs,
the extracted elements (z⋆, r⋆, u⋆) necessarily satisfy
1GT = e(gz, z
⋆) · e(gr, r
⋆) ·
n∏
i=1
e(gi, v
⋆
i ) = e(hz, z
⋆) · e(hu, u
⋆) ·
n∏
i=1
e(hi, v
⋆
i ). (10)
Having extracted (z⋆, r⋆, u⋆), B also computes
z† =
n∏
i=1
v⋆i
−χi r† =
n∏
i=1
v⋆i
−γi u† =
n∏
i=1
v⋆i
−δi , (11)
so that (z†, r†, u†) also satisfies (10). Since (z†, r†, u†) and (z⋆, r⋆, u⋆) both satisfy (10), the triple
(z‡, r‡, u‡) =
(z⋆
z†
,
r⋆
r†
,
u⋆
u†
)
necessarily satisfies e(gz, z
‡) · e(gr, r
‡) = e(hz, z
‡) · e(hu, u
‡) = 1GT . To conclude the proof, we argue
that z‡ 6= 1G with overwhelming probability.
To do this, we observe that, if the event Good defined in Game4 actually comes about, then B never
leaks any more information about (χ1, . . . , χn) than A can infer by just observing {(zj , rj , uj)}
t
j=1 in
the public key. Indeed, in this case we have J(SVK⋆) = 0 and J(SVKj) 6= 0 for each j ∈ {1, . . . , q}.
This means that, in the simulated proofs returned by S2(ψ, τsim, ., .), the proofs (pi1,pi2) are perfectly
witness indistinguishable as they are generated for a perfectly hiding Groth-Sahai CRS. For these
simulated proofs, the built-in homomorphic signatures (Cz,Cr,Cu,pi1,pi2) leak nothing about the
specific vector (χ1, . . . , χn) used by B. As a consequence, the same arguments as in [43, Theorem 1]
show that z† 6= z⋆ with probability 1− 1/p. Specifically, in the CRS, {(gi, hi)}
n
i=1 and {(zi, ri, ui)}
t
i=1
provide the adversary with a system of 2n+ t < 3n equations in 3n unknowns {(χi, γi, δi)}
n
i=1, which
leaves z† completely undetermined as long as v⋆ is linearly independent of the rows of
(
Gi,j
)
i,j
. We
thus find
Pr[S5 ∧ Good] = Adv
SDP
B (λ) ·
(
1−
1
p
)−1
.
In turn, in Game5, B implies a PPT distinguisher B
DLIN′ for the DLIN assumption such that we
have the inequality Pr[S5∧Good] <
1
2 ·AdvBDLIN′ (λ) ·
(
1− 1p
)−1
. If AdvDLIN(λ) denotes the maximal
advantage of any PPT distinguisher against the DLIN assumption in G, the probability of event
22
S4 ∧ Good can be bounded as Pr[S4 ∧ Good] ≤
3
2 ·Adv
DLIN(λ) ·
(
1− 1p
)−1
in Game5 in Game4. This
in turn yields
Pr[S3] ≤ 7 ·
√
q · (L+ 1) ·AdvDLIN(λ) ·
(
1−
1
p
)−1
,
so that A’s advantage in breaking the unbounded simulation-soundness of the system is at most
Advuss(A) ≤Advsuf-ots(λ) + 7 ·
√
q · (L+ 1) ·AdvDLIN(λ) ·
(
1−
1
p
)−1
. (12)
⊓⊔
G Proof of Theorem 2
Proof. The completeness property is straightforward to verify. To establish the result, we separately
prove the relative quasi-adaptive zero-knowledge and relative quasi-adaptive simulation-soundness
properties.
Quasi-Adaptive Relative Zero-Knowledge. We consider a sequence of two games which begins
with a game where the adversary has oracle access to the actual prover P and a public verifier on
a real CRS ψ. In the last game, the adversary will be interacting with a simulator (S1, S2) and the
private verifier.
Game1: is a game where the adversary A is given the description ρ of the language Lρ and a real CRS
ψ = (CRS1,CRS2). In addition, the adversary has access to a public verification oracle V(ψ, ., .),
even though it can run the verification algorithm by itself. This will be useful to show that the
private verifier always agrees with the public one when it interacts with a PPT adversary. At
some point, the adversary chooses a pair (v, lbl) along with a witness x ∈ Ztp such that v = g
x·A.
The challenger replies by returning an actual proof π produced by running P(ψ,v,x, lbl). When
A terminates, it outputs a bit β ∈ {0, 1}. We denote by S1 the event that β = 1.
Game2: is like Game1 but the adversary’s public verification oracle V(ψ, ., .) is replaced by the private
verification oracle W(ψ, τv, ., .). Since the private verification algorithm begins by running the
public one, both games are clearly identical until A queries the verification oracle on input of a
candidate (v, (z, r, u, π0), lbl) that is accepted by V(ψ, ., .) but rejected by W(ψ, τv, ., .). If we call
this event F2, we have |Pr[S1]− Pr[S2]| ≤ Pr[F2].
Claim 1. The probability of event F2 can be bounded as Pr[F2] ≤ Adv
SDP(λ) + 1p .
Proof. We first remark that event F2 can only occur for a candidate
(
v, (z, r, u, π0), lbl
)
such that
the vector (v1, . . . , vn, π0, v
α
1 , . . . , v
α
n) is not in the span of {H2i−1,H2i}
t
i=1. Indeed, otherwise, there
would exist x = (x1, . . . , xt) ∈ Z
t
p such that (v1, . . . , vn) = g
x·A and π0 =
∏t
i=1(W
α
i Yi)
xi . In this case,
we would also have
gx·A·(e
⊤+α·d⊤) =
t∏
i=1
(Wαi Yi)
xi ,
and the private verifier W(ψ, τv, ., .) would accept the proof (z, r, u, π0).
It comes that the only way for the adversary to cause a divergence between W(ψ, τv, ., .) and
V(ψ, ., .) is to create a valid-looking one-time linearly homomorphic signature (z, r, u) on a vector
outside span
(
{H2i−1,H2i}
t
i=1
)
. The result of [43][Theorem 1] shows that this occurs with probability
at most Pr[F2] ≤ Adv
SDP(λ) + 1p . 
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Game3: This game like Game2 but, when the adversary outputs its triple (v,x, lbl), the challenger
does not use the witness x ∈ Ztp any longer. To simulate the proof for (v,x, lbl), it first computes
α = H(ρ,v, lbl). Then, using the private vectors d, e ∈ Znp , it computes π0 =
∏n
j=1 v
ej+α·dj
j before
using the private key skots = {(χi, γi, δi)}
2n+1
i=1 to compute a one-time signature
(z, r, u) =
( 2n+1∏
j=1
v
−χj
j ,
2n+1∏
j=1
v
−γj
j ,
2n+1∏
j=1
v
−δj
j )
on the vector v˜ = (v1, . . . , v2n+1), where vn+1 = π0 and vn+i+1 = v
α
i for i = 1 to n. The resulting
proof is easily seen to have the same distribution as in Game2 when v ∈ Lρ. We thus have
Pr[S3] = Pr[S2].
We define the simulator (S1, S2) by having S1 generate the CRS ψ as in Game3 (observe that it
has not changed since Game1) and S2 generate compute the proof without using the witnesses as
in Game3. The verification oracle is implemented as in Game2 and Game3. It easily comes that the
system is computationally quasi-adaptive relatively zero-knowledge if the SDP assumption holds.
Quasi-Adaptive Relative Simulation-Soundness. We have to prove that, even if the simulator
(S1, S2) provides the adversary A with a simulated proof π for a pair (v, lbl), where v ∈ G
n may not
be in Lρ, A will remain unable to produce a new proof (v
⋆, π⋆, lbl⋆) 6= (v, π, lbl) such that v⋆ 6∈ Lρ.
To prove the result, we rely on the smoothness of the projective hash function and on a specific
property of the one-time linearly homomorphic signature of Section 2.5: namely, unless the SDP
assumption is false, it is hard to compute two distinct signatures on the same vector, even when the
private key is available.
We thus proceed with a sequence of games where the first game is the actual game and the last
one is a game where the adversary has statistically no advantage. In Gamei, we denote by Si the event
that the adversary wins.
Game1: is the real game where the adversary A is given the description of Lρ, a simulated CRS ψ and
access to a simulated prover S2(ψ, τsim, ., .) which is queried only once. On this occasion, S2 takes
as input a vector v† ∈ Gn and a label lbl† and it produces a simulated proof π† = (z†, r†, u†, π†0)
that v† ∈ Lρ. To generate ρ ∈ G
t×n according to the distribution DΓ at the beginning of the game,
the challenger computes ρ = gA after having sampled a matrix A ∈ Zt×np with the appropriate
distribution (which is possible since DΓ is efficiently samplable). Moreover, the challenger B
computes a basis W ∈ Z
n×(n−t)
p of the right kernel of A. The adversary is allowed to query
S2(ψ, τsim, ., .) exactly once and the private verifier W(ψ, τv, ., .) on polynomially many occasions.
When A terminates, it outputs a triple (v⋆, π⋆, lbl⋆). The adversary is successful if v⋆ 6∈ Lρ but
(π⋆, lbl⋆) passes the private verification test and (v⋆, π⋆, lbl⋆) 6= (v†, π†, lbl†). We denote by S1 the
latter event. Note that B can recognize this event as it can test if v⋆ 6∈ Lρ by checking whether
v⋆ = (v⋆1, . . . , v
⋆
n) ∈ G
n satisfies
∏n
j=1 v
⋆
j
wji = 1G for each column w
⊤
i = (w1i, . . . , wni)
⊤ of W.
Indeed, the vectors y ∈ Znp in the row space of A are exactly those for which y ·W = 0.
Game2: In this game, we modify the behavior of the private verification oracle W(ψ, τv, ., .) . At each
invocation (including the final invocation on the adversary’s output (v⋆, π⋆, lbl⋆)) on input of a
triple (v, π, lbl), the modified private verification oracle outputs 0 if (v, π, lbl) 6= (v†, π†, lbl†) but
H(ρ,v, lbl) = H(ρ,v†, lbl†). Clearly, Game1 and Game2 proceed identically until the latter event,
called F2, occurs. We have |Pr[S2]− Pr[S1]| ≤ Pr[F2]. Moreover, F2 is unlikely to occur if H is a
collision-resistant hash function: we have Pr[F2] ≤ Adv
CR(λ).
Game3: This game is identical to Game2 with the following difference. When the private verification
oracle W(ψ, τv, ., .) is run on input of the adversary’s proof (v
⋆, π⋆, lbl⋆), it returns 0 in the event
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that π⋆ = (z⋆, r⋆, u⋆, π⋆0) is such that (z
⋆, r⋆, u⋆) 6= (z†, r†, u†) but (v⋆, lbl⋆) = (v†, lbl†). If we
call F3 the event that the private verification oracle W(ψ, τv, ., .) rejects a proof that would have
been accepted in Game2, we have |Pr[S3] − Pr[S2]| ≤ Pr[F3]. Moreover, F3 implies a breach in
the SDP assumption. Indeed, if π⋆0 6= π
†
0, W(ψ, τv, ., .) would not accept π
⋆ in Game2 either,
regardless of whether (z⋆, r⋆, u⋆) 6= (z†, r†, u†) or not. If π⋆0 = π
†
0, event F3 provides the challenger
with two distinct linearly homomorphic signatures (z⋆, r⋆, u⋆) and (z†, r†, u†) on the same vector
(v⋆1, . . . , v
⋆
n, π
⋆
0, v
⋆
1
α⋆ , . . . , v⋆n
α⋆) as we also have α⋆ = α†. As mentioned in Section 2.5 (and as can
be easily observed from the verification equations), this would contradict the SDP assumption
and we thus have |Pr[S3]− Pr[S2]| ≤ Adv
SDP(λ).
Game4: In this game, we further modify the behavior of W(ψ, τv, ., .) when it assesses the the ad-
versary’s output (v⋆, π⋆, lbl⋆). Using the basis W of the right kernel of A, the challenger B first
checks if v⋆ 6∈ Lρ and forces W(ψ, τv, ., .) to return 0 whenever this is the case. If we denote by
F4 the event that W(ψ, τv, ., .) rejects an adversarially-generated triple (v
⋆, π⋆, lbl⋆) that would
have survived the private verification test of Game3, we have |Pr[S4] − Pr[S3]| ≤ Pr[F4]. Since
Pr[S4] = 0 by construction, we are left with the task of bounding Pr[F4].
Claim 2. The probability of event F4 is at most Pr[F4] ≤ 1/(p − q), where q denotes the number of
private verification queries.
Proof. The proof of the claim is a standard argument based on the smoothness of the projective
hash function. If we consider the information that A can infer about the private evaluation key
τv =
(
d = (d1, . . . , dn), e = (e1, . . . , en)
)
by observing the CRS and the proof π† = (z†, r†, u†, π†0), it
amounts to the first 2t+ 1 rows of the left-hand-side member of the following linear system:


Y⊤
W⊤
π†0
π⋆0

 =


A
A
log(v†) α† · log(v†)
log(v⋆) α⋆ · log(v⋆)

 ·
(
e⊤
d⊤
)
(13)
Let us assume that v†,v⋆ 6∈ Lρ. Since the above (2t+2)×2n matrix has full rank when α
⋆ 6= α (which
is the case unless the failure event F1 of Game1 occurs), we see that the only value of π
⋆
0 that would
trick the private verification oracle W(ψ, τ, ., .) of Game3 into accepting π
⋆ is completely independent
of the information provided by the CRS and the simulated proof π† for v†. However, A can also take
advantage of its private verification queries throughout the game. Without any verification query,
(e,d) is constrained by the first 2t+1 rows of (13) to live in a subspace of dimension 2(n− t)− 1 ≥ 1
in Z2np , so that π
⋆
0 has p equally likely values in A’s view. Each private verification query provides
A with an inequality, which allows it to rule out one candidate for the value of π⋆0 that W(ψ, τv, ., .)
would accept. After q queries, A is thus left with p− q equally likely candidates for π⋆0. We thus find
Pr[F4] ≤ 1/(p− q), as claimed. 
Putting the above altogether, A’s advantage is breaking the quasi-adaptive relative simulation-
soundness property is bounded as
Advrss(A) ≤AdvCR(λ) +AdvSDP(λ) +
1
2λ − q
.
⊓⊔
H Proof of KH-CCA Security for the Keyed-Homomorphic Scheme
Instead of relying on the simulation-soundness of the proof system in a modular manner, our proof
of KH-CCA security uses a direct security analysis in order to obtain a tighter reduction.
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Theorem 3. The threshold keyed-homomorphic cryptosystem of Section 5 provides KH-CCA security
in the sense of Definition 1 assuming that: (i) Σ is a strongly unforgeable one-time signature; (ii)
The DLIN assumption holds in G. Concretely, the advantage of any PPT adversary A is at most
Advkh-cca(A) < (qe + 1) ·Adv
suf-ots(λ) +
3
2
·AdvDLIN(λ)
+ 7 ·
√
(qe + 1) · (L+ 1) ·Adv
DLIN(λ) ·
(
1−
1
p
)−1
+
1
p
,
where Advsuf-ots(λ) denotes A’s probability to break the strong unforgeability of Σ and qe is the
maximal number of evaluation queries involving derivatives of the challenge ciphertext.
Proof. The proof uses of a sequence of games starting with the real attack game and ending with a
game where the adversary A has no advantage. For each i, we also denote by Si the event that the
challenger outputs 1 in Gamei.
Game1: is the actual attack game with the only difference that the challenger B does not erase skot
during the key generation phase. In details, the adversary is given the public key PK and the set of
verification keys VK = (V K1, . . . , V KN ). If A decides to query the RevHK oracle at some point,
B reveals SKh. At each corruption query i ∈ {1, . . . , N}, B reveals the queried private key share
SKi = (P1(i), P2(i), P (i)). At each decryption query, B faithfully runs the real shared decryption
algorithm. At each evaluation query, A supplies two ciphertexts C(1), C(2) which are processed
by B as in the evaluation algorithm. We denote by C†1, . . . , C
†
qe the outputs of the Eval(SKh, .)
oracle when the latter is queried on a pair (C(1), C(2)) such that C(j) ∈ D for some j ∈ {1, 2} (in
other words, {C†l }
qe
l=1 are the results of evaluation queries which increase |D|). We also denote by
SVK
†
1, . . . , SVK
†
qe the one-time verification keys appearing in these ciphertexts and assume w.l.o.g.
that they are chosen by B at the very beginning of the game.
When the first phase is over, the adversary A chooses two distinct messages M0,M1 ∈ G and
obtains C⋆ = (SVK⋆, C⋆0 , C
⋆
1 , C
⋆
2 , C
⋆
3 , Z
⋆, R⋆, U⋆,C⋆z,C
⋆
r ,C
⋆
u,pi
⋆
1,pi
⋆
2, σ
⋆) which is an encryption of
Mβ , for some random coin β
R← {0, 1} flipped by B.
In the second phase, A makes more decryption, evaluation and corruption queries under the
restriction of not asking for a partial decryption of a ciphertext in D or for more than t − 1
private key shares throughout the entire game. Eventually, A halts and outputs β′ ∈ {0, 1}. The
challenger B outputs 1 if and only if β = β′. We denote this event by S1.
Game2: This game is identical to Game1 with the difference that the challenger B rejects all decryption
queries involving ciphertexts C = (SVK, C0, C1, C2, C3, Z,R, U,Cz,Cr,Cu,pi1,pi2, σ) such that
SVK ∈ {SVK⋆, SVK†1, . . . , SVK
†
qe}. It also returns ⊥ at each evaluation query (C
(1), C(2)) for which
there exists j ∈ {1, 2} for which C(j) contains a verification key SVK(j) such that SVK(j) = SVK†l ,
for some SVK†l ∈ {SVK
⋆, SVK†1, . . . , SVK
†
qe}, but C
(j) 6= C†l .
If we define F2 to be the event that B rejects a ciphertext that would not have been rejected
in Game1, we see that Game2 and Game1 proceed identically until event F2 occurs. We thus
have the inequality |Pr[S2] − Pr[S1]| ≤ Pr[F2]. Moreover, event F2 would imply a breach in
the strong unforgeability of the one-time signature. Indeed, since A is not allowed to query the
partial decryption of any ciphertext in D, a standard argument allows proving the inequality
|Pr[S2] − Pr[S1]| ≤ Pr[F2] ≤ (qe + 1) ·Adv
suf-ots(λ). In the forthcoming games, we will assume
that SVK 6∈ {SVK⋆, SVK†1, . . . , SVK
†
qe} at each decryption query.
Game3: We modify the generation of the challenge ciphertext C
⋆. Namely, instead of computing
C⋆0 = Mβ · X
θ
1 · X
θ
2 , using the encryption exponents θ1 = logf (C
⋆
1 ) and θ2 = logh(C
⋆
2 ), B uses
the private key (x0, x1, x2) and computes C
⋆
0 =Mβ ·C
⋆
1
x1 ·C⋆2
x2 ·C⋆3
x0 . Likewise, instead of using
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(θ1, θ2) to derive the triple (z
⋆, r⋆, u⋆) at step 3 of the encryption algorithm, B uses the simulation
trapdoor skrand = {(χi, γi, δi)}
3
i=1 of the USS proof system and computes
z⋆ =
3∏
i=1
C⋆i
−χi r⋆ =
3∏
i=1
C⋆i
−γi u⋆ =
3∏
i=1
C⋆i
−δi . (14)
Finally, (Z⋆, R⋆, U⋆) is generated using skot = {(ϕi, ϑi, ̟i)}
3
i=1 as
Z⋆ =
3∏
i=1
C⋆i
−ϕi R⋆ =
3∏
i=1
C⋆i
−ϑi U⋆ =
3∏
i=1
C⋆i
−̟i .
Then, B conducts steps 4-6 as in the actual encryption algorithm. It is easy to see that this
change does not modify A’s view since C⋆0 still equals C
⋆
0 = Mβ ·X
θ1
1 ·X
θ2
2 and the distributions
of (z⋆, r⋆, u⋆) and (Z⋆, R⋆, U⋆) remain the same as in Game2. We thus have Pr[S3] = Pr[S2].
Game4: This game is identical to Game3 with a new modification in the challenge ciphertext. Namely,
instead of setting C⋆3 = g
θ1+θ2 , where θ1 = logf (C
⋆
1 ) and θ2 = logh(C
⋆
2 ), we choose it as C
⋆
3
R← G.
At the third step of the encryption algorithm, the linearly homomorphic signature (z⋆, r⋆, u⋆) is
computed according to (14), as previously. Under the DLIN assumption in G, this modification
should not significantly alter A’s behavior. In particular, we have |Pr[S4]−Pr[S3]| ≤ Adv
DLIN(λ).
Game5: From this point forward, we make explicit use of the discrete logarithms αf = logg(f) and
αh = logg(h), which is allowed since we are done with the transition consisting in tampering
with C⋆3 in the challenge ciphertext. In Game5, we first change the treatment of ciphertexts
C = (SVK, C0, C1, C2, C3, Z,R, U,Cz,Cr,Cu,pi1,pi2, σ) involved in pre-challenge decryption and
evaluation queries. Namely, B simply ignores the linearly homomorphic signatures contained these
ciphertexts and returns ⊥ if C3 6= C
1/αf
1 · C
1/αh
2 . Otherwise, it responds as in earlier games.
If we call F5 the event that B rejects a ciphertext that would not have been rejected in Game4,
Game5 and Game4 are clearly identical until F5 occurs, so that |Pr[S5]−Pr[S4]| ≤ Pr[F5]. At the
same time, Lemma 1 shows that Pr[F5] ≤
1
2 ·Adv
DLIN(λ) + 1/p.
The proof of Lemma 1 implies that, even if A chooses to expose the evaluation key SKh at the
very beginning of the game, it should not be able to create valid-looking ill-formed ciphertexts
before the challenge phase unless the DLIN assumption is false. This will help us prove that the
scheme remains IND-CCA1 if SKh is revealed to the adversary when the game begins.
Game6: We now modify the treatment of post-challenge queries and introduce yet another event F6.
In this game, the challenger B halts and outputs a random bit in the event that the adversary
A manages to query the partial decryption oracle or the evaluation oracle on a ciphertext C⋄ =
(SVK⋄, C⋄0 , C
⋄
1 , C
⋄
2 , C
⋄
3 , Z
⋄, R⋄, U⋄,C⋄z,C
⋄
r ,C
⋄
u,pi
⋄
1,pi
⋄
2, σ
⋄) where SVK⋄ 6∈ {SVK⋆, SVK†1, . . . , SVK
†
qe}
and C⋄3 6= C
⋄
1
1/αf ·C⋄2
1/αh although (C⋄z,C
⋄
r ,C
⋄
u,pi
⋄
1,pi
⋄
2) is a valid linearly homomorphic signature
on the vector (C⋄1 , C
⋄
2 , C
⋄
3 ). We say that C
⋄ is a fatal query in this case. Since Game6 is identical to
Game5 until event F6 occurs, we have |Pr[S6]−Pr[S5]| ≤ Pr[F6]. Lemma 2 demonstrates that the
DLIN assumption can be broken in the group G if event F6 occurs with non-negligible probability.
More precisely, Lemma 2 shows that Pr[F6] ≤ 7 ·
√
(qe + 1) · (L+ 1) ·Adv
DLIN(λ) ·
(
1− 1p
)−1
.
Game7: We now modify the partial decryption oracle and replace the non-interactive proofs contained
in decryption shares µˆi by simulated NIZK proofs. This entails to turn (f1,f2,f3) into a perfectly
hiding Groth-Sahai CRS (where f3 is in the span of f1 and f2) and non-interactive proofs for
multi-exponentiation equations are simulated using the trapdoor of the simulated CRS. Under the
DLIN assumption, this change is not noticeable to A and we have |Pr[S7]−Pr[S6]| ≤ Adv
DLIN(λ).
In Game7, it is easy to see that A has no advantage whatsoever, so that Pr[S7] = 1/2. Indeed, in
the challenge phase, we have (C⋆1 , C
⋆
2 , C
⋆
3 ) = (f
θ1 , hθ2 , gθ1+θ2+θ3), where θ1, θ2, θ3 ∈R Zp. This implies
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that C⋆0 can be written as C
⋆
0 = Mβ · X
θ1
1 · X
θ2
2 · g
θ3·x0 . The latter equality implies that, as long as
x0 ∈ Zp remains independent of A’s view, so does the challenger’s bit β ∈ {0, 1}.
To see why A does not learn anything about x0 ∈ Zp, we first note that the homomorphic
evaluation key SKh is independent of x0, so that homomorphic evaluation queries leak nothing about
it. We also remark that, in Game7, decryption shares µˆi contain NIZK proofs that are simulated
without using private key shares. Hence, as long as A does not corrupt more than t− 1 servers, the
only possible way to infer information about x0 = P (0) is to trick the partial decryption oracle into
accepting an invalid ciphertext. However, in Game7, all invalid ciphertexts are explicitly rejected.
We thus find the announced result
|Pr[S1]−
1
2
| < (qe + 1) ·Adv
suf-ots(λ) +
3
2
·AdvDLIN(λ)
+ 7 ·
√
(qe + 1) · (L+ 1) ·Adv
DLIN(λ) ·
(
1−
1
p
)−1
+
1
p
.
⊓⊔
Lemma 1. In Game5, the probability of event F5 is at most Pr[F5] ≤
1
2 ·Adv
DLIN(λ) + 1p .
Proof. We show that, if event F5 occurs with non-negligible probability in Game5, there exists an
efficient algorithm B that solves a SDP instance (Gz, Gr, Hz, Hu) with nearly the same probability.
In turn, B implies a distinguisher for the DLIN assumption in G.
Algorithm B generates public key components are defined as in the actual scheme. In particular,
B sets Gi = Gz
ϕiGr
ϑi and Hi = Hz
ϕiHu
̟i with ϕi, ϑi, ̟i
R← Zp for i ∈ {1, 2, 3}.
Throughout the game, the reduction B answers A’s decryption queries in the same way as in
Game5. Moreover, since B has generated (skrand, pkrand) faithfully, it is able to consistently reveal the
evaluation key SKh in case A decides to corrupt the evaluator. If event F5 occurs with non-negligible
probability, we know that, before the challenge phase, A must query the partial decryption or the
homomorphic evaluation of a ciphertext C = (SVK, C0, C1, C2, C3, Z,R, U,Cz,Cr,Cu,pi1,pi2, σ) such
that (Z,R,U) is a valid one-time linearly homomorphic signature on (C1, C2, C3) although (C1, C2, C3)
is outside the span of (f, 1, g) and (1, h, g). When algorithm B detects this event (by observing that
C3 6= C
1/αf
1 C
1/αh
2 ), it computes its own signature
(Z†, R†, U †) = (
3∏
i=1
Ci
−ϕi ,
3∏
i=1
Ci
−ϑi ,
3∏
i=1
Ci
−̟i) (15)
on (C1, C2, C3). We claim that, with overwhelming probability,
(Z‡, R‡, U ‡) =
( Z
Z†
,
R
R†
,
U
U †
)
is a non-trivial solution to the SDP instance since Z‡ 6= 1G with overwhelming probability.
Indeed, we remark that the vector (ϕ1, ϕ2, ϕ3) is independent of A’s view before the challenge
phase. Consequently, since (C1, C2, C3) is linearly independent of (f, 1, g) and (1, h, g), the adversary
A is only able to predict the value Z† of (15) with probability 1/p. Given that we also have the
inequality AdvSDP(λ) ≤ 12 ·Adv
DLIN(λ), we thus find Pr[F5] ≤
1
2 ·Adv
DLIN(λ) + 1p as claimed. ⊓⊔
In the transition from Game5 to Game6, we could rely on the unbounded simulation-soundness
of the underlying QA-NIZK proof to argue that fatal decryption or evaluation queries only occur
with negligible probability. To do this, we would have to build a reduction algorithm that interacts
with a simulation-soundness challenger for a given matrix ρ ∈ G2×3 and simultaneously emulates A’s
challenger in the KH-CCA game. Since the reduction would not have the matrix A ∈ Z2×3p , it would
have no way to detect fatal queries. Consequently, the reduction would have to guess this query, which
would introduce an extra degradation factor in the reduction.
28
Lemma 2. In Game6, the probability of event F6 is at most
Pr[F6] ≤ 7 ·
√
(qe + 1) · (L+ 1) ·Adv
DLIN(λ) ·
(
1−
1
p
)−1
.
Proof. The key argument of the proof is that, conditionally on a certain desirable event, the evaluation
oracle Eval(SKh, .) will never information-theoretically reveal its evaluation key SKh.
Assuming that event F6 occurs with non-negligible probability in Game6, we show that there
exists a distinguisher for the DLIN assumption in G. To this end, we consider a subsequence of games
starting with Game6 and ending with Game6.2. For each j ∈ {0, 1, 2}, we define F6.j as the counterpart
of event F6 in Game6.j (note that F6.j is efficiently detectable for each j). We first show that, as long
as the DLIN assumption holds, if Pr[F6] is non-negligible, so is Pr[F6.2].
Game6.0 : This game is identical to Game6 but we modify the generation of pkrand when the public
key is set up. Namely, the vectors (f1,f2, {f3,i}
L
i=0) are chosen by setting f1 = (f1, 1G, g) and
f2 = (1G, f2, g) where f1, f2
R← G are chosen at random. As for {f3,i}
L
i=0, they are obtained as
f3,0 = f
ξ0,1
1 · f
ξ0,2
2 · (1, 1, g)
ξ0,3 · (1, 1, g)µ·ζ−ρ0 (16)
f3,i = f
ξi,1
1 · f
ξi,2
2 · (1, 1, g)
ξi,3 · (1, 1, g)−ρi , i ∈ {1, . . . , L}
with µ R← {0, . . . , L}, ξ0,1, ξ1,1, . . . , ξL,1
R← Zp, ξ0,2, ξ1,2, . . . , ξL,2
R← Zp, ξ0,3, ξ1,3, . . . , ξL,3
R← Zp and
ρ0, ρ1, . . . , ρL
R← {0, . . . , ζ−1}, with ζ = 2(qe+1) and where qe is the number of evaluation queries
that increase the cardinality of D. Note that this change is only conceptual since the distribution
of {f3,i}
L
i=0 has not changed since Game6. We thus have Pr[F6.0] = Pr[F6].
Game6.1: This game is like Game6.0 but we consider another event Good which causes the chal-
lenger B to abort and output a random bit if it does not occur. Let SVK†1, . . . , SVK
†
qe be the
distinct one-time verification keys appearing in outputs of the Eval(SKh, .) oracle when the latter
is invoked on a ciphertext in D. Let also SVK⋆ be the verification key involved in the chal-
lenge ciphertext C⋆ and let SVK⋄ be the one involved in the first fatal query C⋄. We know that
SVK⋄ 6∈ {SVK⋆, SVK†1, . . . , SVK
†
qe}. For each verification key SVK ∈ {0, 1}
L, we consider the func-
tion J(SVK) = µ · ζ − ρ0 −
∑L
i=1 ρi · SVK[i]. We also define Good to be the event that
J(SVK⋄) = 0 ∧ J(SVK⋆) 6= 0 ∧
∧
j∈{1,...,qe}
J(SVK†j) 6= 0. (17)
We remark that the random exponents ρ0, ρ1, . . . , ρL are chosen independently of A’s view: this
means that the simulator could equivalently define {f3,i}
L
i=0 first and only choose {ρi}
L
i=0 –
together with values {ξ3,i}
L
i=0 explaining the {f3,i}
L
i=0 – at the very end of the game, when
SVK⋆, SVK†1, . . . , SVK
†
qe , SVK
⋄ have been defined. The same analysis as [54] (using the simplifica-
tions of Bellare and Ristenpart [6]) shows that Pr[F6.1 ∧Good] ≥ Pr[F6.0]
2/(27 · (qe+1) · (L+1)).
This follows from the fact that, for any set of queries, a lower bound on the probability of event
Good is 1/(2(qe + 1)(L + 1)). Indeed, from the known results [54, 35] on the programmability of
Waters’ hash function, we know that the probability, taken over the choice of (µ, ρ0, . . . , ρL), to
meet the conditions (17) is at least 1/(2(qe + 1)(L+ 1)).
Game6.2: We modify again the way to compute pkrand in the generation of the public key. Namely,
the vectors f1 = (f1, 1G, g), f2 = (1G, f2, g) are chosen as before. However, instead of generating
{f3,i}
L
i=0 as in Game6.1, we set them as
f3,0 = f
ξ0,1
1 · f
ξ0,2
2 · (1, 1, g)
µ·ζ−ρ0 (18)
f3,i = f
ξi,1
1 · f
ξi,2
2 · (1, 1, g)
−ρi , i ∈ {1, . . . , L}
29
which amounts to setting ξ0,3 = ξ1,3 = . . . = ξL,3 = 0. Clearly, {f3,i}
L
i=0 are no longer uniform in
the span of
(
f1,f2, (1, 1, g)
)
. Still, this change should have no noticeable effect on A if the DLIN
assumption holds in G. Concretely, if a fatal decryption/evaluation query occurs with substantially
different probabilities in Game6.2 and Game6.1, we can construct a DLIN distinguisher B
DLIN in the
group G (recall that the reduction can detect fatal queries using αf = logg(f) and αh = logg(h)).
This distinguisher uses the random self-reducibility of DLIN to construct many independent-
looking instances from the same distribution out of a given instance. For this reason, we can write
|Pr[F6.2 ∧ Good]− Pr[F6.1 ∧ Good]| ≤ AdvBDLIN(λ).
In Game6.2, we show that an occurrence of event F6.2 implies an algorithm B solving a given SDP
instance (gz, gr, hz, hu) with non-negligible probability, which a fortiori breaks the DLIN assumption
in G as the latter is implied by SDP.
By hypothesis, we know that the adversary A somehow manages to produce a fatal decryp-
tion/evaluation query on a ciphertext C⋄ for which (C⋄1 , C
⋄
2 , C
⋄
3 ) is outside the span of (f, 1G, g)
and (1G, h, g) but (C
⋄
z,C
⋄
r ,C
⋄
u,pi
⋄
1,pi
⋄
2) ∈ G
15 satisfies the verification equations. At this point, if
the event Good introduced in Game6.1 occurs, we must have J(SVK
⋄) = 0, which implies that
fSVK⋄ = f3,0 ·
∏L+1
i=1 f
SVK
⋄[i]
3,i lies in span(f1,f2). Consequently, C
⋄
z, C
⋄
r and C
⋄
u are necessarily
perfectly binding and extractable commitments. Using (logg(f1), logg(f2)), B can thus extract the
committed group elements (z⋄, r⋄, u⋄) ∈ G3 by BBS-decrypting the ciphertexts (C⋄z,C
⋄
r ,C
⋄
u). Since
(pi⋄1,pi
⋄
2) are perfectly sound Groth-Sahai proofs, the extracted elements (z
⋄, r⋄, u⋄) necessarily satisfy
1GT = e(gz, z
⋄) · e(gr, r
⋄) ·
3∏
i=1
e(gi, C
⋄
i ) = e(hz, z
⋄) · e(hu, u
⋄) ·
3∏
i=1
e(hi, C
⋄
i ). (19)
Having extracted (z⋄, r⋄, u⋄), B also computes
z† =
3∏
i=1
C⋄i
−χi r† =
3∏
i=1
C⋄i
−γi u† =
3∏
i=1
C⋄i
−δi , (20)
so that (z†, r†, u†) also satisfies (19). Since (z†, r†, u†) and (z⋄, r⋄, u⋄) both satisfy (19), the triple
(z‡, r‡, u‡) =
(z⋄
z†
,
r
⋄
r†
,
u
⋄
u†
)
satisfies e(gz, z
‡) · e(gr, r
‡) = e(hz, z
‡) · e(hu, u
‡) = 1GT . To conclude the proof, we argue that z
‡ 6= 1G
with overwhelming probability.
To do this, we observe that, if the event Good defined in Game6.1 actually comes about, then B
never leaks any more information about (χ1, χ2, χ3) thanA can infer by just observing {(zj , rj , uj)}
2
j=1
in the public key. Indeed, in this case we have J(SVK⋆) 6= 0 and J(SVK†j) 6= 0 for each j ∈ {1, . . . , qe}.
This means that, in the challenge ciphertext and all its homomorphic evaluations, the proofs (pi1,pi2)
are perfectly WI as they are generated for a perfectly hiding Groth-Sahai CRS. For these cipher-
texts, the built-in homomorphic signatures (Cz,Cr,Cu,pi1,pi2) leak nothing about the specific vec-
tor (χ1, χ2, χ3) ∈ Z
3
p used by B. As a consequence, we can apply the same arguments as in the proof
of Lemma 1 when it comes to argue that z† 6= z⋄ with probability 1− 1/p. We thus find
Pr[F6.2 ∧ Good] = Adv
SDP
B (λ) ·
(
1−
1
p
)−1
.
In turn, B implies a PPT distinguisher BDLIN
′
for the DLIN assumption such that we have the
inequality Pr[F6.2∧Good] <
1
2 ·AdvBDLIN′ (λ)·
(
1− 1p
)−1
. IfAdvDLIN(λ) denotes the maximal advantage
of any PPT distinguisher against the DLIN assumption in G, the probability to have F6.1 ∧Good can
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be bounded as Pr[F6.1 ∧ Good] ≤
3
2 ·Adv
DLIN(λ) ·
(
1 − 1p
)−1
in Game6.1. This eventually yields the
stated result
Pr[F6] ≤ 7 ·
√
(qe + 1) · (L+ 1) ·Adv
DLIN(λ) ·
(
1−
1
p
)−1
.
⊓⊔
I More Efficient Adaptively Secure CCA2-Secure Threshold Cryptosystems
from the DLIN and k-Linear Assumptions
As a use case for our relatively sound QA-NIZK proofs, we can construct a new robust non-interactive
threshold encryption scheme based on the DLIN assumption and prove it secure against chosen-
ciphertext attacks in the adaptive corruption setting [16, 28].
Threshold cryptosystems were initially suggested in [13, 22, 23]. In the static corruption setting,
several non-interactive CCA-secure threshold systems have been described in the random oracle model
[53, 27] and in the standard model [9, 14, 55].
Adaptively secure distributed cryptosystems with chosen-ciphertext security were proposed in [36,
1] but they require some interaction during the decryption process. Non-interactive solutions were
put forth in [41, 42] but, as we will see, they are less efficient than the solution proposed here.
Consider the DLIN-based cryptosystem based on 1-universal hash proof systems where the ci-
phertext (C1, C2, C3, C0) = (f
θ1 , hθ2 , gθ1+θ2 ,M ·Xθ11 ·X
θ2
2 ) is decrypted as M = C0 ·C
−x1
1 C
−x2
2 C
−x0
3 ,
where (X1, X2) = (f
x1gy, hx2gx0) is the public key and (x1, x2, x0) is the private key. In [42], chosen-
ciphertext security was achieved using a publicly verifiable one-time simulation-sound proof of well-
formedness for (C1, C2, C3). In the security proof, the one-time simulation-soundness property guar-
antees that the adversary is unable to trick the decryption oracle into returning the decryption of
an invalid ciphertext, by generating a fake proof for an invalid triple (C1, C2, C3). For this reason,
the specific private key (x1, x2, x0) used by the reduction remains perfectly hidden. Consequently, if
the challenge ciphertext is computed by choosing a random tuple (C1, C2, C3) ∈R G
3 and computing
C0 =M ·C1
x1 ·C2
x2 ·C3
x0 , the plaintext M is independent of the adversary’s view. To prove adaptive
security in the threshold setting, [42] took advantage of the fact that the private key (more precisely,
all private key shares) is known to the reduction at all times in the Cramer-Shoup paradigm.
A similar approach was taken in6 [37], where a different method was used to achieve a form of
one-time simulation-soundness. In combination with relatively sound proofs [37], the techniques of
Jutla and Roy [38] reduce the size of ciphertexts to 9 group elements under the DLIN assumption.
Here, as already suggested in [43], we obtain shorter ciphertexts by using linearly homomorphic
signatures. We include in the public key the verification key of a one-time linearly homomorphic SPS
for n = 3 as well as signatures on (f, 1G, g) and (1G, h, g). This allows publicly deriving a homomor-
phic signature (z, r, u) on the vector (C1, C2, C3) = (f
θ1 , hθ2 , gθ1+θ2) and each ciphertext consists of
(z, r, u, C0, C1, C2, C3). In the security proof, the signature (z, r, u) serves as evidence that (C1, C2, C3)
has the right form at each pre-challenge decryption query: in order to generate a proof for a false
statement, the adversary has to break the security of the homomorphic signature, by deriving a sig-
nature on a vector (C1, C2, C3) outside the span of (f, 1, g) and (1, h, g).
While this technique does provide IND-CCA1 security, the scheme remains malleable and thus
vulnerable to post-challenge decryption queries. This is where the relatively sound proof system of
Section 4 comes into play. By using (C0, C1, C2, C3) as a label in the relatively sound proof that
(C1, C2, C3) lives in span((f, 1, g), (1, h, g)), we can make sure that, with all but negligible probabil-
ity, the reduction will never accept a proof for a malformed (C1, C2, C3) after the challenge phase
without breaking the DLIN assumption. The key idea of the techniques of [37] is to guarantee that
6 Although it was not mentioned in [37], relatively sound proofs can be used to acquire CCA2 security in the threshold
setting as well, as will be emphasized later on.
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the adversary will not be able to send a decryption query for which the private verifier and the public
verifier disagree on (C1, C2, C3).
I.1 Construction
In the threshold setting, the construction can be seen as a DLIN-based version of the Cramer-Shoup
encryption scheme [20] (which is identical to the scheme in [52]), where the ciphertext components
(C1, C2, C3) and the designated verifier proof C4 are additionally signed using a homomorphic signa-
ture. The scheme goes as follows.
Keygen(λ, t,N): choose bilinear groups (G,GT ) of prime order p > 2
λ and do the following.
1. Choose g, f, h R← G.
2. Choose random x0, x1, x2
R← Zp, y0, y1, y2
R← Zp and w0, w1, w2
R← Zp in order to compute
X1 = f
x1gx0 , X2 = h
x2gx0 , Y1 = f
y1gy0 , Y2 = h
y2gy0 and W1 = f
w1gw0 , W2 = h
w2gw0 .
3. Generate a Groth-Sahai CRS (f1,f2,f3) to be used for proving the validity of decryption
shares. Namely, choose f1, f2
R← G as well as φ1, φ2
R← Zp and define vectors
f1 = (f1, 1, g), f2 = (1, f2, g) f3 = f
φ1
1 · f
φ2
2 · (1, 1, g).
4. Choose random polynomials P1[Z], P2[Z], P0[Z] ∈ Zp[Z] of degree t− 1 such that P1(0) = x1,
P2(0) = x2 and P0(0) = x0. Set Xi,1 = f
P1(i)gP0(i) and Xi,2 = h
P2(i)gP0(i) for i = 1 to N .
5. Choose a collision-resistant hash function H : {0, 1}∗ → Zp.
6. Generate a key pair for the one-time linearly homomorphic signature of Section 2.5 with n = 7.
Let
(
gz, gr, hz, hu, {(gi, hi)}
7
i=1
)
be the public key and let {(χi, γi, δi)}
7
i=1 be the corresponding
private key.
7. Generate one-time homomorphic signatures {(Zj , Rj , Uj)}
4
j=1 on the independent vectors
h1 = (f, 1, g, Y1, 1, 1, 1) ∈ G
7, h2 = (1, h, g, Y2, 1, 1, 1) ∈ G
7
h3 = (1, 1, 1,W1, f, 1, g) ∈ G
7, h4 = (1, 1, 1,W2, 1, h, g) ∈ G
7.
8. Define decryption key shares SK = (SK1, . . . , SKN ) as SKi = (P1(i), P2(i), P0(i)) ∈ Z
3
p for
each i ∈ {1, . . . , N}. The vector VK = (V K1, . . . , V KN ) of verification keys is defined as
V Ki = (Xi,1, Xi,2) ∈ G
2 for each i ∈ {1, . . . , N}. The public key is defined to be
PK =
(
g, f1, f2, f3, X1, X2, Y1, Y2, W1, W2, gz, gr, hz, hu,
{gi, hi}
7
i=1, {(Zj , Rj , Uj)}
4
j=1, H
)
.
Encrypt(M,PK): to encrypt a message M ∈ G, conduct the following steps.
1. Choose θ1, θ2
R← Zp and compute
C0 =M ·X
θ1
1 ·X
θ2
2 , C1 = f
θ1 , C2 = h
θ2 , C3 = g
θ1+θ2 C4 = (W
α
1 Y1)
θ1 · (Wα2 Y2)
θ2 ,
where α = H(C0, C1, C2, C3) ∈ Zp.
2. Construct a linearly homomorphic signature (Z,R,U) on (C1, C2, C3, C4, C
α
1 , C
α
2 , C
α
3 ) ∈ G
7.
Namely, compute
Z = Zθ11 · Z
θ2
2 · Z
θ1·α
3 · Z
θ2·α
4 , R = R
θ1
1 ·R
θ2
2 ·R
θ1·α
3 ·R
θ2·α
4 , U = U
θ1
1 · U
θ2
2 · U
θ1·α
3 · U
θ2·α
4
3. Output the ciphertext
C = (C0, C1, C2, C3, C4, Z,R, U) ∈ G
8 (21)
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Ciphertext-Verify
(
PK,C
)
: parse C as per (21). Compute α = H(C0, C1, C2, C3) ∈ Zp and return
1 if and only if
1GT = e(gz, Z) · e(gr, R) ·
3∏
i=1
e(gi · g
α
i+4, Ci) · e(g4, C4)
1GT = e(hz, Z) · e(hu, U) ·
3∏
i=1
e(hi · h
α
i+4, Ci) · ·e(h4, C4),
Share-Decrypt(PK, i, SKi, C): on inputs SKi = (P1(i), P2(i), P0(i)) ∈ Z
3
p and C, return (i,⊥) in
the event thatCiphertext-Verify
(
PK,C
)
= 0. Otherwise, compute µˆi =
(
νi,CP1 ,CP2 ,CP , πµi
)
which consists of a partial decryption νi = C
P1(i)
1 ·C
P2(i)
2 ·C
P0(i)
3 , commitments CP1 ,CP2 ,CP0 to
exponents P1(i), P2(i), P0(i) ∈ Zp and a proof πνi that these satisfy the equations
νi = C
P1(i)
1 · C
P2(i)
2 · C
P0(i)
3 , Xi,1 = f
P1(i)gP0(i), Xi,2 = h
P2(i)gP0(i). (22)
The commitments CP1 ,CP2 ,CP0 and the proof πνi are generated using the CRS f = (f1,f2,f3).
Share-Verify
(
PK, V Ki, C, (i, µˆi)
)
: parse the ciphertext C as (C0, C1, C2, C3, C4, Z,R, U) and V Ki
as (Xi,1, Xi,2) ∈ G
2. If µˆi = ⊥ or µˆi cannot be properly parsed as
(
νi,CP1 ,CP2 ,CP0 , πµi
)
, return
0. Otherwise, return 1 if πµi is a valid proof. In any other situation, return 0.
Combine(PK,VK, C, {(i, µˆi)}i∈S): for each i ∈ S, parse the share µˆi as
(
νi,CP1 ,CP2 ,CP , πµi
)
and return ⊥ if Share-Verify
(
PK,C, (i, µˆi)
)
= 0. Otherwise, compute ν =
∏
i∈S ν
∆i,S(0)
i , which
equals ν = Cx11 · C
x2
2 · C
x0
3 = X
θ1
1 ·X
θ2
2 and in turn reveals M = C0/ν.
If each element has a 256-bit representation on BN curves [4] at the 128-bit security level, the ci-
phertext overhead amounts to 1792 bits. The DLIN-based scheme of [42] has a ciphertext overhead
comprised of 14 group elements and a one-time signature with its verification key (or 4864 bits using
Groth’s one-time signature [32]). The results of Escala et al. [25] reduce this overhead to 3328 bits.
The recent techniques of Jutla and Roy [37, 38] – which also work in the threshold setting although
it was not explicitly stated in [37] – lead to ciphertexts comprised of 9 group elements under the
DLIN assumption and 3k+3 under the k-linear assumption. Under DLIN, we thus further compress
ciphertexts by 11% while relying on the same assumption and retaining tight security7.
Under the k-linear assumption, our improvement becomes more important as the ciphertext re-
duces to 2k + 4 group elements. Specifically, we need k + 1 elements for the homomorphic signature
of Appendix D, another k+1 elements to contain the k-linear instance, one element for the Cramer-
Shoup-like proof π0 and one element to carry the plaintext. This allows saving k − 1 group elements
with respect to the techniques of [37, 38].
We believe this result to be of importance as these schemes can potentially serve as building blocks
for protocols in the multi-linear setting [29, 19]. Indeed, the (k − 1)-linear problem is easy in groups
equipped with a k-linear map (as shown in, e.g., [25]) but we can hope for instantiations where the
k-linear assumption holds, as seems to be the case in [19].
From a computational standpoint, the validity of a ciphertext only requires to compute a product
of 7 pairings. Under the the DLIN assumption, the framework of [42] requires a product of 12 pairings
in the ciphertext verification algorithm.
7 Note that the techniques of Lewko [40] can be applied to the scheme of [41] to get a DLIN-based system where
ciphertexts contain 7 group elements and a one-time key pair (SVK, σ). However, the reduction involves a degradation
factor proportional to the number of decryption queries.
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I.2 Security
We prove security in the sense of a definition which is identical to Definition 1 with the difference
that there is no evaluation key SKh, no evaluation oracle and no RevHK oracle.
As in the scheme of [37], the security proof appeals to the private verification algorithm while the
scheme itself only uses the public verification algorithm.
While it would be possible to rely on the relative zero-knowledge and relative soundness properties
of the proof system in a modular way, we obtain a better exact security via a direct analysis.
Theorem 4. The above threshold cryptosystem is IND-CCA secure against adaptive corruptions
assuming that: (i) H is collision-resistant; (ii) The DLIN assumption holds in G. More precisely, the
advantage of any PPT adversary A is at most
Adv(A) ≤ AdvCR-hash(λ) + 3 ·AdvDLIN(λ) +
2q + 1
2λ − q
, (23)
where q is the number of decryption queries and the first term of the right-hand-side member accounts
for the maximal advantage of any PPT collision-finding algorithm for H.
Proof. The proof uses of a sequence of games starting with the real attack game and ending with a
game where the adversary A has no advantage. For each i, Si stands for the event that the challenger
B outputs 1 at the end of Gamei.
Game1: is the real attack game. In details, the adversary is given the public key PK and the set of
verification keys VK = (V K1, . . . , V KN ). At each corruption query i ∈ {1, . . . , n}, the challenger
B reveals the queried private key share SKi = (P1(i), P2(i), P0(i)). At each decryption query,
B faithfully runs the real shared decryption algorithm. In the challenge phase, the adversary A
chooses messages M0,M1 ∈ G and obtains C
⋆ = (C⋆0 , C
⋆
1 , C
⋆
2 , C
⋆
3 , C
⋆
4 , Z
⋆, R⋆, U⋆) which is an
encryption of Mβ , for some random coin β
R← {0, 1} flipped by B. We can assume w.l.o.g. that
(C⋆1 , C
⋆
2 , C
⋆
3 ) are computed at the beginning of the game as they do not depend on Mβ .
In the second phase, A makes more adaptive queries under the restriction of not asking for a
partial decryption of C⋆ or for more than t − 1 private key shares throughout the entire game.
Eventually, A halts and outputs β′. At this point, B outputs 1 if β = β′ and 0 otherwise.
Game2: This game is like Game1 except that the challenger B halts and outputs a random bit in the
event that, before the challenger phase, A queries the partial decryption oracle on a ciphertext
C = (C0, C1, C2, C3, C4, Z,R, U) such that (C1, C2, C3) = (C
⋆
1 , C
⋆
2 , C
⋆
3 ). Since (C
⋆
1 , C
⋆
2 , C
⋆
3 ) are
invisible to A until the challenge phase, this event can only occur with probability q/p, so that
|Pr[S2]− Pr[S1]| < q/p.
Game3: We introduce another failure event F3 and let B halt and output a random bit if this
event occurs. We define F3 as the event that A makes a decryption query involving a valid
ciphertext C = (C0, C1, C2, C3, C4, Z,R, U) such that H(C0, C1, C2, C3) = H(C
⋆
0 , C
⋆
1 , C
⋆
2 , C
⋆
3 ) but
(C⋆0 , C
⋆
1 , C
⋆
2 , C
⋆
3 ) 6= (C0, C1, C2, C3).
We see that Game3 and Game2 are identical until event F3 occurs, which would contradict the
collision-resistance of H. We thus have |Pr[S3]−Pr[S2]| ≤ Pr[F3] ≤ Adv
CR-hash(λ). In subsequent
games, if we define the values α = H(C0, C1, C2, C3) and α
⋆ = H(C⋆0 , C
⋆
1 , C
⋆
2 , C
⋆
3 ), we will hence-
forth assume that α 6= α⋆ for each decryption query C = (C0, C1, C2, C3, C4, Z,R, U).
Game4: In this game, we modify the decryption oracle and reject all post-challenge decryption queries
(C0, C1, C2, C3, C4, Z,R, U) such that (C0, C1, C2, C3, C4) = (C
⋆
0 , C
⋆
1 , C
⋆
2 , C
⋆
3 , C
⋆
4 ). Clearly Game4
is identical to Game3 until B rejects a ciphertext that would not have been rejected in Game3.
If we call the latter event F4, we find that |Pr[S4] − Pr[S3]| ≤ Pr[F4]. Since F4 necessarily
implies (Z,R,U) 6= (Z⋆, R⋆, U⋆), any occurrence of F4 necessarily provides A with two distinct
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signatures on the same vector (C⋆1 , C
⋆
2 , C
⋆
3 , C
⋆
4 , C
⋆
1
α⋆ , C⋆2
α⋆ , C⋆3
α⋆), which in turn breaks the SDP
assumption by the specific property of the linearly homomorphic signature (see Section 2.5). It
comes that Pr[F4] ≤ Adv
SDP(B).
Game5: We modify the generation of C
⋆ = (C⋆0 , C
⋆
1 , C
⋆
2 , C
⋆
3 , C
⋆
4 , Z
⋆, R⋆, U⋆) in the challenge phase.
Specifically, instead of computing C⋆0 = Mβ · X
θ1
1 · X
θ2
2 and C
⋆
4 = (W
α⋆
1 Y1)
θ1(Wα
⋆
2 Y2)
θ2 , where
θ1 = logf (C
⋆
1 ) and θ2 = logh(C
⋆
2 ), the challenger B now computes C
⋆
0 = Mβ · C
⋆
1
x1 · C⋆2
x2 · C⋆3
x0
and C⋆4 = C
⋆
1
y1+α⋆w1 · C⋆2
y2+α⋆w2 · C⋆3
y0+α⋆w0 , with α⋆ = H(C⋆0 , C
⋆
1 , C
⋆
2 , C
⋆
3 ). Likewise, instead
of using the encryption exponents (θ1, θ2) to derive a one-time linearly homomorphic signature
(Z⋆, R⋆, U⋆) from the public key, the challenger B uses {(χi, γi, δi)}
7
i=1 and computes
Z⋆ =
7∏
i=1
C⋆i
−χi R⋆ =
7∏
i=1
C⋆i
−γi U⋆ =
7∏
i=1
C⋆i
−δi , (24)
where (C⋆5 , C
⋆
6 , C
⋆
7 ) = (C
⋆
1
α, C⋆2
α, C⋆3
α).
This change is only conceptual since C⋆0 still equals C
⋆
0 = Mβ ·X
θ1
1 ·X
θ2
2 and the distribution
of (C⋆4 , Z
⋆, R⋆, U⋆) has not changed either. We thus have Pr[S5] = Pr[S4].
Game6: Here, we modify the decryption oracle and make use of the exponents (y0, y1, y2, w0, w1, w2)
that were chosen by B during the key generation phase. Namely, the challenger B does not only re-
ject all ciphertexts (C0, C1, C2, C3, C4, Z,R, U) such that (Z,R,U) does not form a valid signature
on (C1, C2, C3, C4, C
α
1 , C
α
2 , C
α
3 ) but also rejects those for which
C4 6= C
y1+α·w1
1 · C
y2+α·w2
2 · C
y0+α·w0
3 ,
where α = H(C0, C1, C2, C3). We raise a failure event F6, which causes B to halt and output a
random bit if it occurs. This event F6 is defined to be the event that the adversary A queries the
decryption oracle on a ciphertext that gets rejected in Game6 and would not have been rejected
in Game5. Since Game6 is identical to Game5 until F6 occurs, we have
Pr[S6] = Pr[S6 ∧ ¬F6] +
1
2
· Pr[F6] = Pr[S5] +
1
2
· Pr[F6].
At the same time, Lemma 3 shows that Pr[F6] ≤ Adv
SDP(λ) + 1p . We remark that a side-effect
of this modified decryption oracle is that it now rejects all post-challenge decryption queries
(C0, C1, C2, C3, C4, Z,R, U) such that (C0, C1, C2, C3) = (C
⋆
0 , C
⋆
1 , C
⋆
2 , C
⋆
3 ) but C4 6= C
⋆
4 .
Since F6 is always efficiently detectable by the challenger B, we can build an efficient DLIN
distinguisher if the probability of event F6 increases when C
⋆
3 is tampered with in the challenge
ciphertext as in the next game.
Game7: This game is identical to Game6 with one modification in the challenge ciphertext. Instead
of setting C⋆3 = g
θ1+θ2 , where θ1 = logf (C
⋆
1 ) and θ2 = logh(C
⋆
2 ), we choose it as C
⋆
3
R← G. The
linearly homomorphic signature (Z⋆, R⋆, U⋆) is computed according to (24), as previously. Under
the DLIN assumption in G, this modification should have no noticeable impact on A’s behavior.
In particular, we have |Pr[S7]− Pr[S6]| ≤ Adv
DLIN(λ).
Game8: We modify the partial decryption oracle and replace the non-interactive proofs contained
in decryption shares µˆi by simulated NIZK proofs. This entails to turn (f1,f2,f3) into a per-
fectly hiding Groth-Sahai CRS (where f3 is in span(f1,f2)) and non-interactive proofs for multi-
exponentiation equations are simulated using the trapdoor of the simulated CRS. Under the DLIN
assumption, this change is not noticeable by A and we have |Pr[S8]− Pr[S7]| ≤ Adv
DLIN(λ).
Game9: In this game, we modify again the decryption oracle and make use of the discrete logarithms
αf = logg(f) and αh = logg(h). Since we are done with the transition consisting in replacing
C⋆3 by a random element, we are free to use (αf , αh) from this point forward. We thus introduce
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a modification in the treatment of decryption queries C = (C0, C1, C2, C3, C4, Z,R, U). This, B
rejects all ciphertexts C such that C3 6= C
1/αf
1 · C
1/αh
2 . Otherwise, it answers as in Game8.
If we define F9 to be the event that B rejects a ciphertext which would not have been rejected
in Game8, we see that Game9 and Game8 are identical from A’s view until F9 occurs. Therefore it
comes that
Pr[S9] ≤ Pr[S9 ∧ ¬F9] + Pr[F9] = Pr[S8] + Pr[F9].
The same arguments as in the proof of Cramer and Shoup show that Pr[F9] ≤ q/(p − q). More
precisely, after i decryption queries, the adversary is left with p − i equally likely candidates for
the value of C4 that would have been accepted by the private ciphertext validation algorithm.
The probability that the i-th decryption query satisfies the test given that the first i− 1 queries
have failed it is thus at most i/(p− i).
In Game9, it is easy to see that A has no advantage whatsoever and we have Pr[S9] = 1/2. Indeed,
in the challenge phase, we have (C⋆1 , C
⋆
2 , C
⋆
3 ) = (f
θ1 , hθ2 , gθ1+θ2+θ3), with θ1, θ2, θ3 ∈R Zp, so that C
⋆
0
can be written as C⋆0 =Mβ ·X
θ1
1 ·X
θ2
2 · g
θ3·x0 . The latter equality implies that, as long as x0 ∈ Zp is
independent of A’s view, so is the bit β ∈ {0, 1}.
We also note that, in Game9, decryption shares µˆi contain NIZK proofs that are simulated without
using private key shares and thus leak no information about these. It comes that, as long as A does
not corrupt more than t− 1 servers, the only possible way to infer information about x0 = P (0) is to
make decryption queries on invalid ciphertexts (i.e., for which (C1, C2, C3) lies outside the span of f
and h).
We thus find
|Pr[S1]−
1
2
| <AdvCR-hash(λ) + 2 ·AdvDLIN(λ) + 2 ·AdvSDP(λ) +
2q + 1
p− q
.
Since any algorithm solving SDP immediately provides a DLIN distinguisher, we also have the in-
equality AdvSDP(λ) ≤ 12Adv
DLIN(λ), which yields
|Pr[S1]−
1
2
| <AdvCR-hash(λ) + 3 ·AdvDLIN(λ) +
2q + 1
2λ − q
(25)
and the claimed result follows. ⊓⊔
Lemma 3. In Game6, the probability of event F6 is at most Pr[F6] ≤ Adv
SDP(λ) + 1p .
Proof. We show that, if event F6 occurs with non-negligible probability ε in Game6, there exists an
efficient algorithm B that solves a SDP instance (gz, gr, hz, hu) with about the same probability. To
this end, we first remark that F6 can only occur for a decryption query (C0, C1, C2, C3, C4, Z,R, U)
such that (C1, C2, C3, C4, C
α
1 , C
α
2 , C
α
3 ) is outside span(h1,h2,h3,h4). Indeed, otherwise, there exist
integers θ1, θ2 ∈ Zp such that (C1, C2, C3, C4) =
(
fθ1 , hθ2 , gθ1+θ2 , (Wα1 Y1)
θ1(Wα2 Y2)
θ2
)
, in which case
we always have C4 = C
y1+αw1
1 · C
y2+αw2
2 · C
y0+αw0
3 and the rejection rule of Game6 does not apply.
Using the technique of [43][Theorem 1], we show that event F6 implies an algorithm solving the
given SDP instance with nearly the same probability. Algorithm B begins by setting up gi = gz
χigr
γi
and hi = hz
χihu
δi , with χi, γi, δi
R← Zp for i ∈ {1, . . . , 7}. Other public key components are generated
as in the real scheme and the public key is given to the adversary.
Throughout the game, the reduction B answers A’s decryption queries in the same way as in
Game6. By hypothesis, A must query the decryption of a ciphertext (C0, C1, C2, C3, C4, Z,R, U) such
that (Z,R,U) is a valid linearly homomorphic signature on the vector (C1, C2, C3, C4, C
α
1 , C
α
2 , C
α
3 ),
where α = H(C0, C1, C2, C3), but C4 6= C
y1+αw1
1 ·C
y2+αw2
2 ·C
y0+αw0
3 , which implies that the vector is
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not in span(h1,h2,h3,h4). When B detects this event, it defines (C5, C6, C7) = (C1
α, C2
α, C3
α) and
computes its own signature
(Z†, R†, U †) = (
7∏
i=1
Ci
−χi ,
7∏
i=1
Ci
−γi ,
7∏
i=1
Ci
−δi) (26)
on (C1, C2, C3, C4, C5, C6, C7). We claim that, with overwhelming probability,
(Z‡, R‡, U ‡) =
( Z
Z†
,
R
R†
,
U
U †
)
is a non-trivial solution to the SDP instance since Z‡ 6= 1G with all but negligible probability.
To see this, we first note that the vector (χ1, . . . , χ7) is independent of A’s view before the
challenge phase. Hence, since (C1, C2, C3, C4, C5, C6, C7) is linearly independent of (h1,h2,h3,h4),
the adversary A can only predict Z† (as it is computed in (26)) with negligible probability 1/p. The
probability Pr[F6] can thus be bounded as Pr[F6] ≤ Adv
SDP
B (λ) +
1
p . ⊓⊔
In the proof of the above theorem, the relative simulation-soundness property of the proof system
is notably used in the transition from Game8 to Game9. In order to obtain a tighter reduction, we
chose not to rely on this property in a modular way. In the modular approach, we would have to
build an algorithm Brs that contradicts this property using an adversary for which event F9 occurs
with non-negligible probability. This algorithm Brs would have to interact with the relative soundness
challenger for a given language ρ ∈ G2×3 for which Brs does not have the underlying matrix A ∈ Z2×3p
of discrete logarithms. For this reason, Brs would not be able to efficiently detect when F9 occurs. To
break the relative soundness property, Brs would have to guess the decryption query for which this
event occurs, which is only possible with probability 1/q. In the exact security result (23), we would
thus lose a multiplicative factor of O(q).
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